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REDUCING CRIME AND IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN BRITISH COLUMBIA: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE

A Discussion Paper Prepared by
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for the:

BC Progress Board

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November 15, 2006

Hon. George Abbott
Minister of Health
Shuswap, MLA
Parliament Buildings
Victoria, BC V8W 9E2

Dear Minister:

I am pleased to forward you a copy of a new Progress Board discussion paper entitled *"Reducing Crime and Improving Criminal Justice in British Columbia: Recommendations for Change"*.

By way of background, the BC Progress Board is an independent panel of 18 senior business and academic leaders established by Premier Gordon Campbell in July 2001 to competitively benchmark BC's economic, innovation, education, environment, health and social performance over time and relative to other jurisdictions. The Board also advises on ways to improve provincial performance.

If you have any questions, please contact me at the coordinates below or by e-mail at Tim.McEwan@gov.bc.ca

Yours sincerely,

Tim McEwan
Executive Director

TMM/mb

Encl.

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REDUCING CRIME AND IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN BRITISH COLUMBIA: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE

Executive Summary

In 1995, British Columbia had one of the highest rates of crime in Canada. However, over the past ten years, crime rates in the province have been improving overall and for each of the major crime categories: violent crime; property crime; and other crimes.

British Columbia's relative position within Canada is improving, but it still lags behind the Canadian crime rate for all major categories. For example, British Columbia is still last among the provinces for drug-related offences although this may be a product of police enforcement activity rather than a measure of the actual amount of crime with respect to drugs. British Columbia's rate of total drug offences (607 per 100,000 population) is nearly double that of Saskatchewan (310 per 100,000), the next highest province.

British Columbia's 2005 total Criminal Code offence rate fell 14 percent from its 1995 rate, keeping pace with the drop in the nation as a whole. Similarly, British Columbia has kept pace with the overall rate of decline in property offences for the nation (down 27 and 29 percent, respectively), although the province still has the highest rate among all the provinces at 6,234 per 100,000 population (over 1.6 times the national rate of 3,738).

British Columbia's 2005 violent crime rate (1,214 offences per 100,000 population) has dropped 14 percent from its 1995 rate (1,411). Since 2001, British Columbia's violent crime rate has stabilized at just over 1,200 violent incidents per 100,000 population. As with other crime categories, British Columbia's violent crime rate is the third highest, behind Saskatchewan and Manitoba. It is notably higher than the national rate, which has been below 1,000 incidents per 100,000 population since 1997.

The Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) and municipal crime rates for Vancouver and Victoria, reflect, for the most part, the provincial trends. Property crime is down for both Vancouver and Victoria at the CMA level at -29 and -21 percent, respectively, keeping pace with the national reduction in property crime rates (down 25 percent). As with property offences, rates of violence at the CMA level shows Vancouver and Victoria as having strong reductions over the 1995 figures, with -21 and -31 percent, respectively, for 2004, the last year for which CMA data are available. Vancouver's total violent crime rate has been less than the provincial rate for each year since 1995.

Between 2004 and 2005, Vancouver is the most improved among Canadian CMAs with at least 500,000 population in the motor vehicle theft category, with a 13.4 percent reduction. Vancouver also evidenced a strong reduction in break and enters. Robbery rates also show Vancouver is improving although they remain well above many other provincial and CMA robbery rates. For the past four years, Vancouver CMA robbery rates were roughly double those for Victoria CMA. In 1995 the Vancouver CMA robbery rate was approximately 250 per 100,000, while the Victoria CMA and the national rates were 130 and 104 per 100,000 population, respectively. While the Canadian robbery rate has remained relatively stable since the mid-1990s, rates have declined for British Columbia and its major CMAs. Compared to Washington and Oregon, British Columbia's robbery rate is well above Oregon state (109 to 68 per 100,000), but similar

to Washington (92 per 100,000 population).

Homicide rates are the most reliable comparison point of all violent crime categories. Recent declines in the Pacific Northwest of the United States have narrowed the gap between those states and British Columbia and other provinces in Canada. For 2005, the Seattle Metropolitan Statistical Area (the unit most comparable to the Canadian CMA) has an identical homicide rate to Vancouver CMA at 2.9 incidents per 100,000 population. Oregon's homicide rate is similar to that of British Columbia (2.2 and 2.3 respectively). British Columbia's 2005 homicide rate is slightly above the national rate (2.0), but well below Manitoba (4.2) and Saskatchewan (4.3).

Public opinion polls (1997-2006) show that British Columbia and the West see crime as more of a problem than the Eastern provinces. This general feeling is supported by the most recent victimization data from the 2004 General Social Survey (GSS). Property crime is the primary type of crime in the minds of Canadians, and British Columbians specifically. Both public opinion polls and reported victimization rates are also reflected in the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data.

In terms of individual characteristics, both victims of property-and personal-related crimes, and violent offenders, are well understood by analysts. The most active persons are at the highest risk of victimization. Urban populations are also more concerned about crime and more likely to be victimized. Each of these characterizations of risk for offending and victimization have been stable for the ten years reviewed in this report, and quite likely for some time before 1995 as well.

Aboriginal rates of victimization and involvement in criminal proceedings are notably higher than for non-Aboriginals. The overall criminal victimization rates reported in the 2004 GSS mirror those from the previous GSS in 1999, with Aboriginals reporting approximately three times as many victimization experiences than non-Aboriginals (31,900 versus 10,100 incidents per 100,000 population). Aboriginal populations tend to be over-represented in a number of socio-demographic characteristics that are associated with increased rates of both victimization and criminal involvement.

The general youth crime rates follow the general crime rate "drop" in the early 1990s. It is not clear if youth offending patterns changed or, perhaps more likely, whether police and Crown charging practices changed during this time. Nationally, youth charge rates are substantially higher than for adults, especially for property offences. Since 1993, the rates of property, violence and other crime charges involving youth are higher than any of the same categories for adults. However, charge rates are not the same as offence rates, the metric used in other analyses in this report. It is not possible from the aggregate data to discern if youth offence rates (which are not reported) are similar or not to the adult offence rates, although criminal justice practitioners and analysts tend to believe that this is indeed the case. Interestingly, charge rates for property and violent crimes are similar for both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal youth.

Although Aboriginal ancestry is reported in only 3 percent of the population, Aboriginal people comprise 17 percent of all victims of homicide. Similarly, where the ethnicity of the offender

is known, Aboriginals are charged in over 20 percent of homicides.

A number of factors have been identified as possible explanations for the unequal rates of involvement as both victims and offenders across the major crime categories. Aboriginal populations are younger, have higher unemployment rates and lower incomes, and have lower levels of educational attainment. There is also evidence of a trend for Aboriginal children living in urban areas to be from single parent households more frequently (46 percent) than non-Aboriginal children (18 percent).

There are two ways in which British Columbia's crime and victimization rates may be further reduced: (i) by identifying and tackling the primary causes of crime in the province; and (ii) by identifying and correcting the inefficiencies in the provincial criminal justice system that may, directly and indirectly, be contributing to criminal activity.

According to the individuals consulted for this study, and various reports and other literature, there are four primary causes of crime in British Columbia (i.e., key factors underlying criminal behaviour):

(i) Widespread substance abuse (both drugs and alcohol) and the activities of the criminal business organizations involved in the illegal drug trade that, in part, feed substance abuse;

(ii) Defective and/or deficient childhood development practices;

(iii) Mental disorder, including cognitive impairments such as brain injuries and fetal alcohol spectrum disorder; and,

(iv) The impoverished and unstable lifestyles experienced by many individuals living in inner urban areas, many of whom are chronic, repeat offenders addicted to drugs and alcohol.

Of all the problems and challenges facing the criminal justice system in the province, three primary clusters stand out. These clusters of problems were consistently identified by the individuals consulted for this report, regardless of where they were working within the criminal justice system:

(i) The apparent failure of the criminal justice apparatus to ensure that offenders face the consequences of their behaviour. Examples include:
- A failure to hold offenders to account when they breach the conditions of their probation and other orders;
- A failure to provide appropriate supervision of those sentenced to community based dispositions (e.g., community service orders), or who are given a conditional sentence;
- Lenient sentencing, or at least a widespread perception that the courts in British Columbia are generally easier on offenders than their counterparts in the rest of Canada and especially in neighbouring jurisdictions.

(ii) A failure to guarantee the speedy and fair disposition of cases once an offender is identified, to ensure that justice is swift, sure and effective. For example, the processing of offenders, especially from arrest to final court disposition, is cumbersome and extraordinarily bureaucratic. There appear to be two particularly challenging bottlenecks: the

approval of charges by Crown Counsel following the arrest of an individual by the police; and, the number of Provincial Court appearances that are required before a case is disposed of.

(iii) The problem of inter-agency and inter-ministry barriers and disorganization (the silo, or separate solitudes, problem). This is a major challenge in British Columbia not only within the criminal justice system but also with respect to the intersection between the system and other related systems such as health and social services.

If these challenges can be addressed successfully there will be a major and positive impact upon the criminal justice system and, in all probability, eventually upon the rates of crime and victimization in the province.

To this end, this report contains five recommendations.

REDUCING CRIME AND IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN BRITISH COLUMBIA: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE

Summary of Recommendations

Recommendation 1:

The provincial government should create, in partnership with the federal and municipal governments, an agency or other body such as a Criminal Justice Task Force or a Criminal Justice Commission to address the core issues and challenges facing the provincial criminal justice system, especially the effective coordination of the activities of the relevant government ministries.

The roles and functions of the Task Force or Commission should include the following:

(a) To review and resolve the three core problems facing the provincial criminal justice system that are identified in Part III of this report. Particularly, and as a matter of priority, the following issues:
- sentencing practices in the British Columbian courts
- the need for Crown Counsel to approve charges
- the delays involved in disposing of cases in the Provincial Court;

(b) To monitor, advise, and make recommendations on the coordination of all the components of the criminal justice system and the associated provincial ministries, federal departments, government agencies, Crown Corporations, non-government organizations, and private sector companies involved, in particular, in the fields of private security and crime prevention;

(c) To initiate and fund independent research on crime and the criminal justice system from which to develop evidence-based policy for the affected ministries and other organizations including, studies of the rates of victimization in the province and of the performance of the components of the criminal justice system, especially the police, Crown Counsel, the judiciary and corrections.

The choice of body or agency will depend upon whether government wants to create a temporary or a more permanent entity that will play a continuing role monitoring the criminal justice system. If a temporary body is thought to be sufficient then a Task Force with a prescribed life span is probably preferable. A Criminal Justice Commission would involve a more permanent arrangement and could be something to be considered by a temporary Task Force.

The idea of a Commission is not new insofar as Commissions of this kind exist in other jurisdictions, primarily in some states in the United States and Australia and even at the municipal level in the former. The mandates of the Commissions vary – some have the kind of broad role and function recommended above while others are concerned solely with specific criminal justice issues such as organized crime – but the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission seems to be closest, philosophically, administratively, and geographically. If the idea of a similar Commission for British Columbia finds fertile soil it is strongly recommended that the developmental starting point be the Oregon Commission.

The organization and membership of a British Columbia Crime and Criminal Justice Commission should be determined only after appropriate research into similar organizations in other

jurisdictions and following local consultation. However, the Commission would likely consist of key, senior individuals from within the provincial government, federal criminal justice agencies, and the community, appointed by Order in Council for fixed but renewable terms and accountable to the legislature. The Commission should be provided with a budget, some modest premises and a small secretariat, and have a carefully prescribed mandate.

Boards and Commissions exist to address a variety of areas of practice and policy-making in the province, and a Crime and Criminal Justice Commission is probably long overdue. It should be noted that the idea seems to be viewed favourably by some individuals who were asked about this recommendation, albeit late in the consultation process.

It will clearly take some time for the idea of a Commission to be discussed and for a Commission to be set up. In the interim, there are a number of crime and criminal justice system issues that need to be addressed without further delay.

Recommendation 2:

The provincial government must address the problem of the illegal trade in drugs in a clear and consistent manner.

In this regard, there are only three real choices. The following identification of three options should not be read as an endorsement of any one by the BC Progress Board. It is merely a statement of the options.

(a) Lobby the Federal Government to legalize the trade, perhaps limiting access to the products to adults in the same way that tobacco and alcohol access is limited and, in the same vein, treating drug addictions as health rather than criminal justice problems. The trade would be subject to reasonable taxes that could be directed to the health care system. The outcome of such a move is not entirely clear but, arguably, it is unlikely to produce higher levels of demand, and need, than is currently the case. Illegal drugs are being obtained by those who wish to use them, regardless of the prohibition. Importantly, the cost of meeting the health care needs of addicts would be paid for by revenues gathered from the industry that is, in part, responsible for the addiction. This kind of initiative would undoubtedly reduce the size and impact of a significant component of the province's underground economy which likely employs, directly and indirectly, a large number of people and reduce the size, and impact, of the proceeds of crime that are currently circulating in the economy. In addition, criminal justice resources that are currently directed to drug enforcement activities could be directed elsewhere.

(b) In the event the legalization approach is deemed unacceptable (or impractical), and there are many reasons why it is likely to meet with massive resistance both nationally and internationally, the provincial government should provide the resources necessary to eliminate the trade entirely in the province. As the costs of doing business rise dramatically (and this should be the goal of enforcement activities) the industry will probably move elsewhere. Demand for the industry's products will not decline but the collateral criminal activities associated with the industry will likely diminish signifi-

cantly. This approach will require a number of indispensable components:

- a consistent and planned commitment of significant law enforcement resources for up to 10 years;
- expanded, specially trained law enforcement teams;
- new legislation to deal with the proceeds of crime and money laundering activities (particularly, legislation regulating currency exchange businesses);
- coordinated prosecution efforts involving special Crown Counsel;
- the imposition of severe penalties for drug related crimes; and,
- a carefully planned response on the part of both federal and provincial correctional services that will face a dramatically increased demand for secure correctional facilities.

The illegal trade in drugs is the bailiwick of criminal business organizations which, like any other business, are driven by a profit motive. If the costs of doing business increase dramatically and profitability declines, the organizations will likely shut down or move elsewhere. The costs of doing business will increase, and the benefits decrease, if the likelihood of arrest, conviction and significant punishment (including simple incarceration for long periods) are increased, the proceeds of criminal activity are confiscated, and opportunities to conceal or launder those proceeds are diminished or eliminated.

(c) Consideration should also be given to a combination of options (a) and (b) over time, beginning with option (b): vigorous enforcement for a 10 year period aimed at removing criminal business organizations from the illegal drug trade. This should be followed by a stepped introduction of option (a) – decriminalization – once the illegal drug trade is no longer in the hands of criminal business organizations in the province. This option should also include a comprehensive and continuous public education program to reduce the use of, and therefore demand for, drugs that clarifies, rather than glorifies, the role and impact of criminal business organizations.

These are the choices, one of which must be adopted by the provincial government without delay. The *status quo*, of course, is another option, but this is clearly not acceptable if we seek to truly reduce the rates of crime and victimization in the province.

Recommendation 3:

The collateral effects of the illegal drug trade should be addressed without further delay.

This issue has been examined extensively over the past 10 years, the options have been debated, plans have been made and the direction has been set; it is now time for action. Clearly, the Four Pillars Approach, while not without its critics, has been embraced for Vancouver where the problem is particularly acute. Since the problem now seems to be beyond Vancouver it is probably time to expand the approach to the entire province. This will require a commitment of provincial resources but, hopefully, not for a long time.

In support of the Four Pillars Approach, and particularly the law enforcement pillar, it is recommended that the province review and strengthen the *Safe Streets Act* and the *Trespass Act* to give police more power to remove troublesome individuals from public and private places. At the same time, government should provide for appropriate shelter and other support services. The government should also consider the introduction of a statute that provides for the compulsory treatment of those with addictions who decline assistance on a voluntary basis. This legislation would be analogous to the kinds of compulsory treatment provisions in existing provincial legislation notably the *Mental Health Act*, the *Health Act*, and the *Venereal Diseases Act*, and an argument can be made for the issue to be addressed through an amendment to the *Health Act* rather than by creating an entirely new statute. Obviously, there are clear precedents for this kind of statute and it is noteworthy that, in the 1970s, the province enacted a *Heroin Treatment Act* with a similar goal in mind. This Act was subsequently repealed because the need diminished. Legislation of this kind will only be necessary as a last resort and will only work if effective community based treatment facilities and resources are provided.

Other important initiatives worthy of implementation are the following:

- the provision of "wraparound" health and social services perhaps through the establishment of one or more Community Courts as recommended by the Street Crime Working Group;
- provincial and/or municipal legislation that provides for tight regulation of businesses trading in second hand (often stolen) goods; and,
- a reconsideration of the need for safe or secure care legislation to deal with young people and young adults who are choosing to live on the streets and who are often involved in crime, substance abuse and related activities.

The Four Pillars Approach is generally sound but, arguably, there needs to be a better balancing of carrots and sticks and, most of all, there needs to be some action.

Recommendation 4:

The provincial government should immediately review the need for strengthened services to address childhood development issues and move quickly to introduce those services.

Clearly, existing health and social services that address childhood development issues are not adequate at this time. Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) has emerged as a significant issue, especially in Aboriginal communities, and may be linked to criminal behaviour in both youth and adults. There are probably similar problems with the children of drug addicted women although the effect of drugs ingested during pregnancy is not as clear. The province needs a system of early detection of children with problems, not just FASD related problems, through the elementary school system, and appropriate coordinated early intervention strategies and services provided by the Ministries of Health and Children and Family Development. The Ministry of Children and Family Development should take the lead role in developing and/or strengthening their plans to address this issue.

Recommendation 5:

The provincial government should, without delay, review the organization and functions of law enforcement agencies in the province.

Particular attention should be paid to four main issues:

- The regionalization of police services in the two main metropolitan areas: Vancouver and Victoria. The current situation is, to put it mildly, bizarre, and the topic surfaces for serious discussion about once every five years. The situation was last addressed in the 1998 Oppal Report on policing in the province and this report appears to have resulted in some changes in the form of "functional" integration: the creation of cross departmental teams such as IHIT (the Integrated Homicide Investigation Team). At best, and without detracting from the excellence of the work of these groups, this approach has limitations including a continuation of rivalries and tensions between municipal police departments and the RCMP. The creation of two or three regional police services (Capital Regional, Greater Vancouver Regional, Fraser Valley Regional) would be the preferred route and it would be popular amongst most affected police officers, other than some RCMP officers who seem to prefer a single, province-wide police service run entirely by their organization. In fact, the only stumbling block appears to be some local governments in the affected regions who, for political reasons, oppose the change. The reform, therefore, will have to be a provincial government initiative.

- The implementation of initiatives that are often referred to as "Operation Cooperation". This involves the creation of functional partnerships between public police services and private security services that, as a recent Law Commission of Canada report has indicated, have been growing significantly over the past 20 years and that have become private police forces performing many of the traditional police functions such as fixed point observation and limited patrolling. Operation Cooperation is a term coined by the U.S. Department of Justice which supports public-private partnerships in the field of policing. The core premise is simple. Instead of being separate and often conflicting entities, the reality of public/private policing is acknowledged. The resources of the two groups are combined in a more effective way with a common goal of reducing crime through general deterrence created by both visible presence and announced electronic surveillance (Closed Circuit Television or CCTV), fast responses to calls involving the security of property, and a willingness to arrest offenders seen committing crimes even when the target is not the property being protected by the private security service. While the challenges are numerous, the potential is enormous and it is significant that the Downtown Vancouver Business Improvement Area has already started its own version of Operation Cooperation, with some good results.

- A review of both the activities of police and their internal organization to determine whether law enforcement dollars are being spent in most cost effective way. The provincial government should develop a set of best practice guidelines based upon the extensive national and international research on policing styles and techniques and determine,

amongst other things, whether police resources are being diverted by the need to perform duties that could be performed by others at less cost. Key examples would be the offender identification function which could be turned over to non-sworn members; fingerprint and forensic examinations at the scenes of crime which might be better undertaken by technically proficient, non-sworn, scenes of crime examiners; and, the use of process servers, rather than uniformed police officers, to service subpoenas and other documents. A review should also consider whether the community relations activities that take police away from active street duty are worthwhile and whether police crime prevention activities should be handed over to private sector businesses for which crime prevention officers often appear to be acting as salespersons.

- Carefully monitor the success or otherwise of crime reduction strategies being implemented in other countries and by the RCMP at select sites in British Columbia. If evidence indicates that these strategies are successful in reducing crime they should be systematically deployed across the province.

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REDUCING CRIME AND IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN BRITISH COLUMBIA: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE

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I. INTRODUCTION – SETTING THE CONTEXT

The BC Progress Board, established by Premier Gordon Campbell in July, 2001, is an independent panel of 18 senior business and academic leaders. The Board is tasked with benchmarking British Columbia's economic and social performance over time and relative to other jurisdictions. The Board also provides strategic advice on ways to improve performance.

This report is one of three detailed studies commissioned by the Board involving British Columbia's social performance over time and relative to other jurisdictions. The focus of this report is crime and the criminal justice system. The other two reports focus upon British Columbia's performance in the education sector and on low income incidence and long-term unemployment.

The starting point for this report is Performance Indicator 24 (Personal and Property Crime) in the BC Progress Board's Fifth Annual Benchmarking Report, released in December 2005. The current study begins with an analysis of British Columbia's crime rates for the past ten years (1995-2005) in comparison with both selected provinces within Canada, and relevant neighbouring jurisdictions in the United States. Included in Part II is a review of recent victimization surveys and an analysis of the limited data that explore public opinion with respect to crime and the criminal justice system in the province.

Part III of this report is focused upon the factors that appear to be driving crime and victimization rates in the province and that may influence public perceptions of crime and criminal justice. The analysis includes a discussion of the problems created by the illegal trade in drugs and the role of criminal business organizations in that trade. Part III also considers a variety of problems with the operation of the criminal justice system. Part IV contains some key recommendations for reducing crime and improving the criminal justice system in the province. The most prominent recommendation is the creation of a provincial Criminal Justice Task Force or Criminal Justice Commission to address the systemic and other problems within the current law enforcement, Crown prosecution, courts, correctional and related apparatuses. These problems are impeding the development and operation of what could and should be a first class criminal justice system.

The overall focus of this report is predatory "street crime," (e.g., property crimes such as theft and break and enter, and violent crimes such as murder, assault and robbery), rather than corporate and commercial crime. The mandate of the authors of this report did not extend to corporate and commercial crime even though it is acknowledged that these forms of criminal activity are costly and harmful to the populace, sometimes more so than predatory street crime. The BC Progress Board may commission a study of corporate and commercial crime in the province at a later date.

II. CRIME AND VICTIMIZATION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

We begin with a short discussion of the methodological considerations associated with the analysis of crime data, before moving to a brief review of the virtually non-existent literature on crime in British Columbia. Most Canadian criminologists write about issues with a national or regional – rather than provincial – focus except in Quebec and Ontario. This report takes as its starting point the crime-related data presented in the *Fifth Annual Benchmark Report* (2005)[1], and will help readers consider the impact of crime as a component of one of the Progress Board's core targets (*Core Target 6: Social Conditions*).[2] Box 1 outlines the main questions that guided our investigation of British Columbia's crime performance.

Box 1: Main Questions

1. **What is BC's crime "picture", relative to other regions and jurisdictions:**
   - **a) Across the province?**
     At the Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) level, Vancouver and Victoria show modestly different patterns for major crime categories. Vancouver CMA has higher rates for all crimes, but most notably for property crime (total property and theft of motor vehicle) than Victoria CMA.
   - **b) Across Canada?**
     British Columbia's crime rates have declined over the past ten years, but relative to the nine reporting provinces, ranks in the top third for all crime categories.
   - **c) In the States of Washington and Oregon?**
     British Columbia has higher rates of property offences per capita than both states. Homicide rates (a measure of violence) are similar, although higher for the American jurisdictions.
2. **If, as expected, there are noticeable differences in crime trends, what might account for such differences?**
   Part III provides a comprehensive review of possible factors suggested by a range of criminal justice practitioners, professionals and academic researchers.
3. **Given the observed crime trends for BC, what can be done to improve upon our position?**
   Part IV, below, provides five key recommendations, including, the establishment of a permanent Crime and Criminal Justice Commission.

To set out the empirical picture of crime over the past decade, we examine reported crime data for British Columbia, and the two most relevant States on the West Coast: Washington and Oregon. In addition to these more regional comparisons, we examine selected cities of interest, including Vancouver and Victoria Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs), and Seattle, and Portland Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs).

Working with Crime Data: The Uniform Crime Reporting Survey (UCR)

While comparisons of crime trends are relatively straightforward between Canadian jurisdictions, complications arise when comparisons are drawn with cities or states in the United States. Although Canada and the United States employ a similar approach to reporting police statistics that are supplied by local police forces or services to their national collection agencies, there are subtle but critically important differences. Nevertheless, Canadian and American crime rates can be compared, but care must be taken to ensure equivalent categories are used.

The Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) survey has been used in both Canada and the United States since 1962. Police departments in the United States that participate in this survey cover over 95 percent of the national population, while essentially all police services in Canada are covered. Over the years, the original UCR was adapted to include more incident-level data. The first iteration of the UCR (UCR1) included aggregate offense totals for each of the following eight dimensions: homicide, robbery, aggravated assault, break and enter, theft, motor vehicle theft, arson and sexual assault. Yet, even between these broad categories, there are differences between the American and Canadian surveys that require specific adjustments when attempting a comparative analysis.

At present, the Canadian UCR1 has 108 categories, while the American version captures only eight. As such, direct comparisons are not recommended without careful reclassifications.[3] Canada's 108 categories can be re-coded or "rolled up" into more general categories to allow direct comparisons, but one cannot assume equivalency, especially when both versions share a similar name. For example, the American UCR1 only captures "aggravated" assaults, whereas Canadian police have at least eight categories of assaults from which to choose. Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS) researchers have developed detailed guidelines by which one can sum the Canadian sub-categories of the UCR into new data categories that are functionally equivalent and thus comparable to the American survey (see Appendix D).

The second iteration of the UCR (UCR2) captures more detail regarding the actual incident than the UCR1. While more detailed, the coverage base for the UCR2 is not as complete as the initial UCR. In the United States, UCR2 data pertain to policing jurisdictions covering only 15 percent of the national population while the Canadian UCR2 captures just over one-half of the national crime volume (53 percent). Appendix D details how general crime types such as robbery or aggravated assault can be compared across and between the two nations.

Overview of Research on Canadian Crime Rates

Despite a persistent interest in crime trends, little empirical work has been done regarding the British Columbia "picture".[4] There are, of course, national examinations of aggregate trends,[5] but the inclusion of the West in general or British Columbia in particular, is rare. One important exception is a study undertaken in Edmonton, Alberta which explored the potential causes of what has become known as the mid-1990s "crime drop". The study suggests that shifting crime patterns may, in fact, be representative of something other than a real change in crime events per capita; particularly, changes in social forces and policing practices.[6]

A common thread in crime trend research is a discussion of the "dark figure" of crime. The image of the "dark figure" serves as a reminder that crimes known to the police – either by police discovery or through reports from the general public – are an incomplete set of "all crimes".[7] Researchers critical of the value of police-reported data (such as the UCR1 and UCR2) suggest that these numbers reflect the impact of policing practices rather than

anything approximating actual crime trends.[8] The size of this dark figure is, by definition, impossible to measure accurately. However, one can get a sense of its size by combining official measures of crime events (such as the Uniform Crime Reports) and the reported experiences of victims (such as those found in the National Criminal Victimization Survey); these are the two main data sources used in this report. Nevertheless, and despite concerns about the reliability and validity of official police records, they remain an invaluable resource.

A key obstacle for studies of crime rates is the specification of the proper population base, or denominator. In most rate calculations, it is customary to use the total population for any given unit of analysis (e.g., a census tabulation of all persons in a particular municipality). However, recent research suggests that the total population is not always the most appropriate base from which to calculate crime rates.[9] This problem becomes more acute when considering the offence rate for vehicle-related crimes, and burglaries. For such offences, a more meaningful denominator would be the number of registered vehicles in a given jurisdiction or, in the case of burglary, the number of dwellings. Further, census population totals are not normally reflective of the actual population in a particular area at any given time of the day. This is particularly problematic for large urban centres, where entertainment districts or large-scale services can attract large numbers of people at specific times of the day or night who may or may not reside in the area. This effect is minimized when one considers larger population containers such as a municipality, or even at a provincial or state level. Nevertheless, many local areas "feed" larger cities such as Vancouver with people who wish to make use of its facilities (e.g., shopping centres, nightclubs, and other establishments), which can produce an imbalance with respect to total criminal events and their subsequent reporting as crime rates within the jurisdiction.

Crime rates, and especially property crime rates, may also be affected by not only the real changes in the volume of criminal events but also by: fluctuations in the levels of tolerance amongst the population; police and other campaigns to encourage reporting (e.g., of domestic violence); and changes in the practices of insurance companies, particularly increases in deductibles. As the discussion of reporting trends recorded by the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC) set out below indicates, reporting rates may fall when deductibles are increased.

General Factors Affecting Crime Rates

Homicide rates in North America have declined,[10] and many analysts have looked to changes in the substrata of populations for possible explanations. Another population-based consideration is the impact of inter-jurisdictional mobility. Just as population change impacts the economy, the same is true for crime patterns.[11] Youth and young adults generally – and young males in particular – are responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime, especially property offences. For an example of how this might impact crime rates consider the example of communities built around the primary resource sector (e.g., forestry). This sector tends to attract a disproportionate number of young men, and as a consequence, these

communities will contain more people who, as a group, are the most likely to become involved in crime. In short, the higher the concentration of likely offenders that are present in a given population, the more crime will occur.[12]

However, for concentrations of young adults, or more specifically, young adult males, to impact crime rates at the CMA or provincial level, either the size of such sub groups would have to be very large, or they would have to be very active. As will be discussed later in this section, youth crime figures are in decline across Canada and, therefore, the idea of concentrations of young males actively involved in crime does not appear to be as powerful an explanation as was assumed in the past. Although not shown here, British Columbia does not have a disproportionate number of youth or young adult males than other provinces such as Ontario or Alberta. In fact, among the highest proportions of young males can be found in Ontario.[13]

Other suggested factors (see Box 2) affecting crime rates generally in Canada and in the United States include: unemployment and inflation rates; educational attainment levels; family structure; social attitudes; and, the growing effectiveness of crime prevention programs. Each has been marshaled in various ways to account for the notable North American "crime drop" that started between 1991 and 1992.[14] The mixed results of these studies are reviewed elsewhere,[15] and need only a brief mention here. The specific performance of British Columbia on a number of these items is addressed in the other two reports commissioned by the Progress Board, as mentioned in the introduction, in addition to previous reports.[16]

Box 2: Summary of General Factors Thought to Impact North American Crime Rates

1. Differences in sub-populations
2. Unemployment & inflation rates
3. Levels of educational attainment
4. Family structure
5. Social attitudes
6. Crime prevention programs

It is suggested that as economies improve, crime should trend downward, due largely to increases in legitimate incomes and spending power. In short, there are fewer economic incentives or inducements for individuals, on average, to commit property and other economically related crimes, and possibly to a lesser extent, violent crimes, such as those that are linked to enforcing market share for illegal drugs or the movement and sale of stolen property. Educational attainment and family structure are thought to reduce the chances that someone may become involved in crime in the first place. Individuals who enjoy success at school also benefit from higher levels of job stability, disposable income and social status, and are less likely to become interested or involved in crime. Positive parental role modeling and instruction on social and cultural values and stable family structures (i.e., effective and efficient child development practices) promote a sense of belonging to the local community and a stake in society as a whole. If these factors are in place, those who may have otherwise sought out or fallen into a criminal lifestyle will be less inclined to do so. Some of these issues are explored more fully in the next part of this report.

With respect to social attitudes, the general population's capacity and/or willingness to con-

done or censure activities, regardless of their legal status, is an important part of the criminal justice process and of law-making in general. If either legislation or law enforcement practices lag too far behind public sentiment, the criminal justice system is likely to fall into disrepute. The most obvious example for British Columbia's criminal justice system is the current debate concerning the legal status of marijuana possession, and the impact of legislative measures on enforcement practices.[17] This issue features prominently in the next part of this report, and points to possible explanations for crime rates that are higher in the West than elsewhere in Canada.

Higher Crime Rates in the West

The data presented in this report for the period 1995–2005 consistently find higher crime rates in the West over time and across all observed categories, including such crime types as homicide, assault, break and enter and drug offences (see "Crime Rates for Canada, Selected Provinces and Census Metropolitan Areas," below).

Many analysts have observed that the Western provinces (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia) often report the highest crime levels per capita in the nation.[18] A number of potential explanations exist, although no study has definitively explained the phenomenon (see Box 3).

Box 3: Summary of Structural Explanations for the Elevated Crime Rates in the West

1. The East and West have largely different policing traditions.
2. Key technical differences exist for Warrants of Arrest being issued in Ontario, and those served in the West.
3. The criminal justice system is more lenient in the West (and BC in particular) than in other provinces.

The first reason offered for the disparity between East and West is the latter's history with the North West Mounted Police (which of course later became the Royal Canadian Mounted Police). Eastern Canada, on the other hand, had a more direct involvement with regional and provincial police forces such as the Ontario Provincial Police. The presumption here is that the RCMP may have a structurally different approach to policing; one that manifests itself in increased attention to property and other "less serious" crimes than police services in Ontario or Quebec. An adaptation of this argument suggests that the RCMP is more apt to charge for all types of crimes, and that, in some way, this produces higher levels of reporting on the part of the populace. Significantly, property offences appear more prominently in crime rates in the West than elsewhere.

The second suggestion stems from a technical difference in the administration of justice. Ontario courts place restrictions on the distance that an accused can be returned to Ontario to face charges or to appear before the court. Effectively, persons wanted in Ontario can simply travel to British Columbia and not fear being returned to face charges at home, while such geographic limitations are not imposed for warrants originating from other provinces such as British Columbia or Manitoba. The net result is that Ontario's "wants and warrants" may have an additional incentive to move to the West. This is particularly important considering that many high volume property or drug offenders may be removed from one province and

added to another. In this scenario, it would not take many persistent, high rate offenders to impact the overall statistics. Most researchers and police officers agree that small percentages of offenders account for a large proportion of all crimes. This is known as the 20-80 rule: 20 percent of offenders account for 80 percent of crimes known to the police.[19]

The third and final explanation suggests that the legal system in the West, and in British Columbia in particular, is "soft on crime", relative to other regions in Canada. The courts tend to shoulder the bulk of this responsibility, and studies show that British Columbia has shorter custodial sentences, as well as what can be described as "less serious" sanctions than other provinces. British Columbia appears to be the "best" provincial jurisdiction if one were to choose a jurisdiction in which to commit property and certain controlled drugs offences such as possessing, dealing and producing marijuana, if the decision is based solely upon an estimation of court imposed sanctions.[20]

In sum, there is no agreed upon explanation for overall crime patterns in Canada. When considering specific crime types or smaller units of analysis, such as a province or district, more agreement is evident. Despite the lack of a definitive explanation, the most convincing discussions of crime patterns point to a mix of demographic, geographic, economic and social factors as the most fruitful lines of inquiry.[21] Unfortunately, such generalized accounts are not particularly helpful until an examination of a particular unit of analysis is undertaken. The next section starts this process of refinement, beginning with the overall crime rate and then examining aggregate crime rates for violent, property and other offences, before "drilling down" to look at specific crime categories, such as assault and homicide.

Crime Rates for Canada, Selected Provinces and Census Metropolitan Areas

Overall Crime Rates

Figures 1 and 2 set out the total Criminal Code offence rates over time, excluding Criminal Code traffic offences, such as vehicular manslaughter, or impaired operation of a motor vehicle for selected provinces and Census Metropolitan Areas (see Box 4). The excluded offences are viewed by analysts as non-criminal acts that are not on a par with property crime and violent crime.

Ontario (see Figure 1) exhibits a downward trend while British Columbia is relatively stable for the reporting period, climbing only slightly from its low in 2000. Table 1 provides yearly rates for provinces and CMAs depicted in Figures 1 and 2.



The overall crime rate in Edmonton is rising at the steepest rate among the CMAs considered in

Box 4: Key Methodological Notes

This report has two reporting timeframes for Canadian crime rates. At the Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) level, Statistics Canada publishes yearly totals for all crimes by UCR1 and UCR2 categories for 1995-2004. At the national, provincial and municipal levels, selected provinces and municipalities within British Columbia are examined for the full ten year period, 1995-2005. The reader is directed to Appendix E for a more exhaustive list of tables. Data for Oregon State are available only to 2004, while Washington State are available for the full ten year period.

Crime rates are generated using Statistics Canada's population and crime count data. It is important to note that as improvements and corrections in data accuracy occur, Statistics Canada amends its master tables and data reported may have subtle differences from previous studies. This report considers the following general crime categories: crimes against persons (or violent crime), crimes against property, what are classed as "other" crimes, and "total" crimes. Other crimes are those offences that are administrative in nature (such as violations of court ordered conditions, e.g. "bail"), and a series of "vice" or "victimless" crimes – such as prostitution and drug offences. This report follows a widely used convention of measuring total crime as including all Criminal Code offences with the exception of driving-related offences, such as impaired driving, or vehicular manslaughter.

Figure 2: Total Crime Rate by CMA



Source: Statistics Canada

Figure 2, although the Calgary CMA does not follow this trend (See Table 1).[22] Vancouver's total Criminal Code rate has dropped 22 percent compared to 1995. Victoria also improved (by 22 percent), while British Columbia as a whole has seen a 14 percent reduction in total crime rates over the full ten year period. Nevertheless, British Columbia's rate is approximately double that of Ontario for any given year. British Columbia's rate of 11,947 offences per 100,000 population in 2005 is well above Ontario (5,780), and only Saskatchewan has a higher rate among the provinces (see Table 1).

Table 1: Total Crime Rate, per 100,000 population

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Canada	9,008	8,932	8,475	8,161	7,752	7,666	7,655	7,706	8,146	8,051	7,761
Ontario	8,554	8,157	7,470	7,042	6,509	6,409	6,215	6,049	6,011	5,702	5,780
Toronto	7,441	7,219	6,630	5,909	5,475	5,351	5,381	5,301	5,142	4,699	5,355
Manitoba	11,392	11,297	11,006	10,629	10,583	10,746	11,359	11,271	12,566	12,753	11,743
Winnipeg	11,033	11,057	10,428	10,064	9,848	10,447	11,033	10,738	11,942	12,167	11,153
Saskatchewan	11,276	11,685	12,183	12,567	12,312	12,948	13,732	13,709	15,449	15,159	14,320
Saskatoon	10,967	11,573	11,950	11,776	11,690	13,016	12,973	13,017	15,152	13,767	13,236
Alberta	9,087	9,000	9,215	9,136	9,084	8,727	9,090	9,534	10,318	10,390	10,023
Calgary	7,862	7,977	7,992	7,861	7,616	7,124	7,140	7,104	7,333	7,101	7,010
Edmonton	8,663	8,813	9,115	8,710	8,490	8,286	8,937	9,936	10,999	11,332	10,529
British Columbia	13,858	13,853	12,782	12,223	11,639	11,341	11,510	11,651	12,491	12,522	11,947
Vancouver	14,468	14,707	12,826	12,191	11,626	11,280	11,367	11,072	11,793	11,814	11,226
Victoria	12,676	12,420	11,936	11,779	12,157	10,859	10,181	10,208	10,543	10,309	9,932

Source: Statistics Canada

Violent Crime

Figure 3 shows Saskatchewan as having the highest violence rates since 1998, with levels rising 54 percent since 1995. British Columbia was close to Saskatchewan and Manitoba in 1995, but has experienced a continual drop in per capita violent crime towards the rates for Alberta and for the nation as a whole. From 1995 onward, British Columbia's violent crime rate fell 14 per cent, the second fastest decline for the provinces considered in Table 2. Ontario's 2005 rates show the strongest reduction at 22 percent from 1995. From 2001 to 2005, however, this rate of decline has leveled off in British Columbia, and the West, as it has for Canada as a whole.



Figure 4 tracks rates for crimes against persons for selected western Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs) and Toronto, also at the CMA level. Vancouver CMA and Victoria CMA, are driving the overall decline observed for the province as a whole. The Vancouver and Victoria CMAs show strong reductions for violent crimes per capita, dropping 21 and 31 percent respectively, since 1995.



Table 2 also shows Calgary and Edmonton CMA violence rates

Table 2: Violent Crime Rate, per 100,000 population

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Canada	1,009	1,002	993	982	958	984	984	969	965	946	943
Ontario	962	934	909	896	853	887	874	829	780	755	748
Toronto	909	878	863	846	817	876	882	820	761	731	n/a
Manitoba	1,614	1,691	1,723	1,608	1,574	1,642	1,617	1,638	1,630	1,602	1,600
Winnipeg	1,359	1,498	1,478	1,314	1,243	1,366	1,320	1,308	1,241	1,205	n/a
Saskatchewan	1,287	1,333	1,549	1,614	1,610	1,692	1,833	1,853	2,060	2,006	1,983
Saskatoon	1,233	1,293	1,376	1,407	1,338	1,500	1,614	1,597	1,718	1,523	n/a
Alberta	1,006	1,016	1,077	1,101	1,065	1,061	1,102	1,078	1,101	1,087	1,096
Calgary	739	782	848	855	854	879	870	811	853	813	n/a
Edmonton	924	940	975	992	865	932	959	912	933	864	n/a
British Columbia	1,411	1,414	1,400	1,353	1,288	1,259	1,223	1,210	1,214	1,195	1,214
Vancouver	1,296	1,312	1,243	1,178	1,127	1,114	1,058	1,039	1,043	1,028	n/a
Victoria	1,354	1,400	1,446	1,387	1,299	1,146	1,153	1,119	1,095	932	n/a

Source: Statistics Canada

as fluctuating in recent years, with Calgary's latest data point (2004) up 10 percent over 1995, while Edmonton decreased by 6 percent to 864 violent crimes per 100,000 population. Figure 4 illustrates the gradual downward trend for most CMAs, and even Saskatoon's rate has declined from over 1,700 violent crimes per 100,000 population in 2003 to just over 1,500 in 2004.

Property Crime

British Columbia's overall property crime rate is down 27 percent over 1995, only slightly less than the rate of change for Canada as a whole, which dropped 29 percent (see Table 3). Each province examined in Figure 5 shows a noticeable drop between 2004 and 2005. As seen with violent crime rates, the provinces with the highest rates show strong improvement, despite the fact that these jurisdictions remain the highest in the nation. Although Saskatoon surpassed Vancouver in 2003 (See Figure 6) at the CMA level for Criminal Code property offence rates, each is roughly similar to Winnipeg for the latest data point, 2004. Victoria appears to be experiencing an upward trend in 2004, after a period of overall decline since 1995. However, this trend seems unlikely to continue, as break and enter, robbery and theft of motor vehicles is down sharply for Victoria CMA.[23] Winnipeg is also trending upward for 2003 and 2004. Toronto continues to trend downward, with a rate of 2,606 which is well below that observed nationally (3,991).





Other Crimes

The "Other Criminal Code" category (see Table E1, Appendix E) is difficult to interpret in that its constituent categories include drug offences, prostitution, gambling, possessing restricted weapons, mischief, counterfeiting, bail and other court order violations. "Other" offences, such as drugs possession, prostitution and bail violations are also among the most likely offences to be influenced by the capacity of the criminal justice system – particularly police and the courts – to respond formally to violations. Persons involved in gambling, prostitution, or the drug trade, are unlikely to report such offences to the police. In other words, reported offences within these categories are typically the result of police activity, in

Table 3: Property Crime Rate, per 100,000 population											
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Canada	5,292	5,274	4,880	4,569	4,276	4,081	4,004	3,973	4,123	3,991	3,738
Ontario	5,013	4,790	4,269	3,875	3,576	3,376	3,268	3,234	3,203	3,013	2,808
Toronto	4,492	4,402	3,980	3,393	3,186	2,967	2,945	2,952	2,881	2,606	n/a
Manitoba	5,937	5,773	5,469	5,168	5,089	4,975	5,134	4,964	5,593	5,699	4,995
Winnipeg	6,785	6,643	6,058	5,782	5,638	5,745	6,013	5,601	6,442	6,754	n/a
Saskatchewan	6,141	6,316	6,251	6,119	5,828	5,965	5,967	5,795	6,618	6,238	5,484
Saskatoon	6,484	6,859	6,841	6,311	6,466	6,910	6,416	6,369	7,952	6,865	n/a
Alberta	5,210	5,102	5,058	4,965	4,799	4,445	4,413	4,674	5,130	5,064	4,874
Calgary	5,380	5,458	5,352	5,287	5,067	4,509	4,372	4,331	4,472	4,236	n/a
Edmonton	5,303	5,311	5,258	4,968	4,784	4,615	4,773	5,349	6,071	6,428	n/a
British Columbia	8,572	8,695	7,787	7,226	6,793	6,408	6,484	6,536	6,963	6,763	6,234
Vancouver	10,040	10,372	8,936	8,270	7,801	7,307	7,365	7,103	7,409	7,110	n/a
Victoria	7,367	7,095	6,486	6,236	6,739	5,679	5,469	5,547	5,431	5,800	n/a
Source: Statistics Canada											

contrast with violent or property offences which are normally reported to the police by the public.

Figure 7 depicts a selection of the most common categories of this type of offence for British Columbia. While the province's overall rate for "Other Crimes" is rising, this increase is not meaningfully different from that for the nation as whole and is probably a function of stepped-up police activity rather than a real increase in these kinds of crime.

Figure 7: Select Other Criminal Code Offenses, BC



General Municipal Trends in British Columbia

This section of the report focuses on municipal level data for the province from 1995-2005. As the province's largest urban centres, Vancouver and Victoria both are at a higher risk than non-urban or less populated municipalities for property and public order-related crimes as people travel to the city for various reasons, but live outside its boundaries. When comparing urban centres, large municipalities share this pressure on their crime rates more or less equally. In other words, just as Ontario "drives" national rates due to its large population base, a similar effect is evident with the Vancouver CMA and the provincial rate, and the City of Vancouver and the Vancouver CMA rate. Although not shown here, the City of Vancouver rates and the Vancouver CMA rates trend very closely.

Table 4 compares crime rates in selected municipalities and the province as a whole for the ten year period, 1995-2005. The four general offence categories of violent, property, other and total crimes are reported, along with the specific category of robbery.

As Table 4 indicates, Victoria's violent crime rate was slowly approaching the provincial

Table 4: Crime Rates, per 100,000 population											
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Vancouver (Municipality)											
Violent	1,537	1,596	1,445	1,402	1,291	1,213	1,077	1,210	1,201	1,247	1,249
Property	15,106	16,084	14,421	12,416	11,304	10,212	9,604	8,652	8,486	8,481	7,587
Other	2,431	2,006	1,598	1,687	2,081	2,412	2,425	2,637	3,005	3,361	2,883
Total	19,074	19,686	17,464	15,505	14,655	13,836	13,106	12,500	12,692	13,089	11,377
Robbery	484	513	447	443	403	344	310	313	274	286	258
Victoria (Municipality)											
Violent	2,460	2,463	2,674	2,573	2,445	2,157	2,352	2,273	2,208	1,795	1,718
Property	11,593	11,640	11,003	10,814	11,997	10,675	10,479	10,919	10,569	11,190	10,960
Other	5,870	5,772	6,374	6,611	6,633	6,963	6,170	6,165	7,621	5,908	5,918
Total	19,923	19,875	20,051	19,998	21,076	19,795	19,001	19,357	20,399	18,894	18,596
Robbery	294	255	245	259	204	195	205	190	190	204	145
Kelowna (Municipality)											
Violent	1,415	1,313	1,308	1,354	1,346	1,193	790	1,215	1,416	1,569	1,401
Property	11,512	10,554	8,586	8,629	7,488	7,193	3,565	6,428	8,069	9,266	8,326
Other	4,681	4,093	3,498	3,998	4,432	3,937	2,625	4,566	4,522	6,089	5,285
Total	17,607	15,960	13,392	13,981	13,265	12,322	6,980	12,208	14,006	16,924	15,011
Robbery	22	21	73	37	51	64	25	64	93	146	128
British Columbia											
Violent	1,393	1,402	1,401	1,349	1,289	1,259	1,224	1,214	1,214	1,195	1,214
Property	8,454	8,596	7,767	7,195	6,791	6,407	6,473	6,533	6,955	6,757	6,234
Other	3,830	3,676	3,586	3,623	3,550	3,675	3,797	3,915	4,310	4,560	4,498
Total	13,658	13,673	12,754	12,167	11,634	11,340	11,493	11,663	12,479	12,513	11,947
Robbery	58	161	149	141	140	120	113	111	108	108	109
Source: Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, Police Services											

average between 1995 and 2003, and more rapidly since 2004. Because of the recent amalgamation of police forces, Esquimalt was added to the Victoria data, which may account for some of the accelerated decline seen in 2004 and onwards. As a suburban municipality, Esquimalt would presumably not have as many of the large city pressures, and therefore would add more population than crime to the original Victoria municipal totals. Vancouver and Kelowna trend closely with the provincial rate. The City of Vancouver shows declining rates in both total Criminal Code and property offences. Kelowna, on the other hand, has increases for all categories from 2002 onward, especially for robbery (see additionally, Appendix E, Table E4).

Specific Comparisons

This section examines basic trends for specific types of the more general crime categories for selected provinces and CMAs. Homicide rates are often compared inter-jurisdictionally, as these events are the least vulnerable to fluctuations in both reporting practices and classification differences, relative to other crime types. As mentioned earlier in this report, Saskatchewan and Manitoba have the highest homicide rates, while Ontario trails the Canadian rate for each reporting period (see Table E2, Appendix E). It should be noted that in 2002, British Columbia's homicide rate was elevated due to the discovery of human remains, allegedly related to the Robert Pickton case.

Assaults, Levels I, II and III (Table E3, Appendix E) show similar trends to those noted above for the aggregate violent crime rates at the provincial level. British Columbia shows little fluctuation, but dropped from a rate of 1,100 in 1995 to just under 1,000 assaults per 100,000 population in 2005. Saskatchewan and Manitoba are markedly higher than the rest of the provinces.

Drug offences are often at the fore in discussions about differences in offence patterns between Western and Eastern Canada, and especially for British Columbia (Appendix E, Table E5). Drug offences are essentially twice as frequent in British Columbia as for any other province but, as noted earlier, this may be a function of increased police enforcement activity. Manitoba and Saskatchewan are atypically similar to the national and Ontario rates. Proximity for the Prairie Provinces shifts slightly when looking at the CMA level, with Saskatoon's departure (to a rate of over 300) from the Toronto, Edmonton and Calgary cluster at approximately 200 drug offences per 100,000 population. Vancouver and Victoria are well above even Saskatoon at a shared rate of approximately 500 per 100,000 population.

Motor vehicle theft rates are highest in Manitoba, driven by the City of Winnipeg (Table E6, Appendix E). British Columbia and Vancouver remain higher than most other jurisdictions. Significantly, Victoria exhibits a much lower rate, possibly due to the logistical impediments that face car thieves on an island, even one as large as Vancouver Island.

Break and Enter, while still similar to other categories, shows British Columbia as improving its relative position more noticeably for this crime type, with a 42 percent reduction between 1995 and 2005. Vancouver CMA's improvement was 51 percent, second only to Toronto, at -55 percent (Table E7, Appendix E). British Columbia is improving, however, particularly between 2004 and 2005, with a 7 percent drop in break and enter rates.

Youth Crime Trends

Youth crime and youth justice data are notoriously difficult to interpret, as they are subject to all the limitations found in records associated with adults, but have the additional complication of highly selective enforcement practices throughout the youth justice system. Key legislative changes in the mid 1980s to the *Young Offenders Act*, and the advent of the *Youth Criminal Justice Act* in 2003 – the last data point in Figure 8 – should be noted. The general youth crime rates follow the general crime rate "drop" in the early 1990s. It is not clear if youth offending patterns changed or, perhaps more likely, whether police and Crown charging practices changed during this time. The Federal Department of Justice

Figure 8: Adult and Youth Charge Rates



acknowledges that the *Young Offenders Act* was encountering problems during the 1990s, and that "too many young people were charged and often incarcerated with questionable results".[24]

Nationally, youth charge rates are substantially higher than for adults, especially for property offences. Since 1993, the rates of property, violent and other crime charges involving youth are higher than any of the same categories for adults (see Table 5). However, charge rates are not the same as offence rates, the metric used in previous analyses in this report. It is not possible from the aggregate data to discern if youth offence rates (which are not reported) are similar or not to the adult offence rates, although criminal justice practitioners and analysts tend to believe that this is indeed the case.

Table 5: National Charge Rates for Youths and Adults

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Youth									
Violence	941	932	908	902	855	915	947	919	816
Property	2,856	2,761	2,389	2,198	1,945	1,869	1,811	1,715	1,386
Other	1,263	1,250	1,242	1,266	1,224	1,291	1,359	1,285	1,135
Adult									
Violence	530	523	510	494	479	496	517	499	481
Property	719	727	651	615	569	528	522	507	516
Other	597	579	552	561	570	593	638	640	649

Source: Statistics Canada

British Columbia's Crime Performance Compared to Washington and Oregon

As a general rule, the most frequently sought after and quoted crime rate comparisons, at least north of the international border, are those that involve Canadian and American examples. There is an expectation that the Canadian data, and therefore Canada, will look "good", regardless of the crime category. While the Canadian picture is more flattering with respect to crimes involving lethal violence,[25] Canada does not fare nearly so well in the area of property offences.

Total UCR offences cannot be reliably compared between Canada and the United States. However, selected subcategories of violent and property offences can be directly compared, such as homicide, robbery, break and enter, and motor vehicle theft.[26]

Homicide rates for Oregon and Washington State are similar to those for British Columbia from 1999 onward. British Columbia has remained consistent at approximately 2.5 homicides per 100,000 population, with the notable exception of 2002, but as mentioned above, this is largely due to an on-going serial homicide investigation. Large murder cases can seriously distort yearly trends, due to the scoring rules which require police to "count" discovered murders in the year in which they were discovered. Even with this unusual event, British Columbia's homicide rate has dropped from a high of 3.2 in 1995 to 2.3 per 100,000 in 2005 (Appendix E, Table E2). Washington's homicide rate, although it declined sharply over 1995-1999, has consistently been between 3.1 and 3.3 per 100,000 since. Oregon's homicide rate trends similarly to that of British Columbia, although it is slightly higher at

about 3.0 per 100,000.



Figure 9 sets out the aggravated assault[27] rates for Washington, Oregon and selected Canadian provinces, including British Columbia. Note that Figure 9 and Tables 6 and 7 do not include sexual assaults or "simple" assaults (Canadian UCR "level 1 assault") as there are no comparable units in the American UCR (see Appendix D for a detailed discussion of Canadian versus American crime counting practices and their resultant comparability). It is noteworthy that Saskatchewan and Manitoba have aggravated assault rates higher than those in the States of Washington and Oregon. Washington and Oregon aggravated assault rates have declined steadily since 1995, while rates in British Columbia, Alberta and Canada have remained stable for the same time period (Figure 9).

An analysis of robbery rates (Table E4), shows British Columbia falling behind the two American states, although each of these three jurisdictions have shared a decline in rates for the ten year period, but particularly from 1995-2000. Oregon's robbery rate (2001-2004) is virtually identical to Ontario's, at approximately 80 incidents per 100,000 population. British Columbia, by comparison, has stabilized at approximately 110 robberies per 100,000. Saskatchewan, once well below British Columbia and even Ontario (1995-1996), has seen an overall upward trend surpassing its western counterpart in 2003, and its rate of 125 per 100,000 for 2005 sits second only to Manitoba (170 per 100,000).

Total rates for break and enters (or burglaries) follow a pattern similar to other property offences, with British Columbia having higher rates than other provinces for the ten year

Table 6: Reported Crimes Index, Washington, rates per 100,000 population

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Robbery	127	114	118	112	98	97	98	95	93	96	93
Agg. Assault	276	246	261	251	220	219	207	200	204	200	206
Burglary	1,049	1,022	1,082	1,022	917	889	874	892	945	982	963
Theft	3,951	3,770	3,741	3,553	3,222	3,189	3,215	3,137	3,129	3,201	3,157
MV Theft	533	504	557	602	568	584	643	658	662	705	788

Source: Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs

Table 7: Reported Crimes Index, Oregon, rates per 100,000 population

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Robbery	140	124	118	106	89	85	79	79	82	78	n/a
Agg. Assault	337	297	288	270	255	225	193	186	187	186	n/a
Burglary	1,109	991	1,042	932	813	744	765	742	826	851	n/a
Theft	4,253	4,014	4,239	3,811	3,442	3,345	3,561	3,457	3,531	3,347	n/a
MV Theft	723	545	618	542	425	415	439	492	549	532	n/a

Source: Oregon State Police, Criminal Justice Information Services

period, with the exception of Saskatchewan (Table E7, Appendix E). Table E7 also shows Manitoba rates as less than or equal to the British Columbia rates, with both provinces trending closely since 1999; both provinces had break and enter rates of approximately 1,150 per 100,000 over the last two years. Washington and Oregon are noticeably lower than British Columbia, with rates of 970 and 850 per 100,000, respectively.

Motor vehicle theft rates run counter to the general property crime trend observed so far. Although British Columbia is once again among the highest for the years 1995-2003, the last two data points are declining noticeably, along with Saskatchewan. This decline is not seen for the State of Washington, which has had yearly increases in motor vehicle theft rates since 2000, and has nearly reached parity in 2005 (784 per 100,000) with British Columbia (818 per 100,000). Oregon trends similarly with the Canadian rate at 529 per 100,000 population.

It appears that British Columbia has typically higher property offences than not only most provinces in Canada, but also its nearest neighbours in the North West United States. British Columbia's rates for break and enter and robbery are higher than Oregon and Washington.

A further examination of property offences provides an opportunity to examine the impact of reporting levels on crime statistics. Recent data from the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC), suggest that crime data are influenced by the decision-making practices of individual consumers and crime reduction programs such as the Bait Car anti-motor vehicle theft program.

In March of 2004 the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) introduced the Bait Car program after three years of annual increases in reported motor vehicle theft for the province as a whole (Figure 10). The following figures are based on data collected by ICBC. Although the introduction of the Bait Car program attends a recent drop in reported incidents since 2003 for the GVRD, it is not clear whether this drop is a result of the Bait Car program, or simply a return to levels observed between 1996 and 2000. Crime reduction and prevention programs tend to be implemented immediately following a noticeable increase in unwanted events. If a sudden, or noticeable, increase in a series of events is simply an anomaly, most events will eventually return to something approximating their "normal" state. It is not yet clear whether the Bait Car program is the primary, or even a contributing, factor in the declines in auto thefts between 2003 and 2005, but as thefts are not increasing since its introduction, the data do not rule out its usefulness or impact. More time is required before one can make a more definitive assessment of the effects of the Bait Car program.

Figure 10: Auto Theft in the GVRD



Source: Insurance Corporation of British Columbia

As with the GVRD, the decline in reported motor vehicle thefts at the provincial level (Figure 11) began prior to its introduction (assuming that some time would be needed for a first quarter intervention to have an effect on totals for that year (2004). Nevertheless, the overall reduction in incidents from 2003 to 2005 is dramatic.

Figure 11: Auto Theft in BC



Source: Insurance Corporation of British Columbia

Figures 12 and 13 show reported thefts from auto and vandalism made to the provincial insurer. Post 2001 increases in the deductible appear to follow a general downward trend in reporting of theft from auto incidences. Two general hypotheses can be brought to bear on this situation. The first, is that actual incidents of theft from auto are down, thus accounting for the steady decline post 2001. The second hypothesis is less optimistic: rather than a real decline in thefts from automobiles, persons who own and insure vehicles have decided, following a cost-benefit analysis, not to report thefts from automobiles as doing so is not in their best economic interest. This latter hypothesis is consistent with rational decision-making theory, which expects people, in the long run, to make decisions to maximize personal benefit in most cases. If the "reward" for reporting theft from auto is unlikely to include "catching the bad guy", and perhaps involves a further financial penalty in the form of elevated insurance premiums, it would be "reasonable" to simply decline the opportunity to report. Studies of reporting behaviour suggest that the victim's expectations of benefit (or a return on their efforts to report) are a significant part of their decision whether or not to report to the police or insurers.

Figure 12: Theft from Auto in BC



Source: Insurance Corporation of British Columbia

Figure 13: Auto Vandalism in BC



Source: Insurance Corporation of British Columbia

The reporting of vandalism, like theft from automobiles, appears to decline drastically (by almost 50 percent) after increases in the amount of loss not covered by insurance.

Perceptions from the General Social Survey

According to the 2004 General Social Survey (GSS), Canadian's perceptions of personal safety remain high with 94 percent of the population reporting satisfaction with their self-assessed safety levels. Similarly, the public report being satisfied with the police and police service levels (see Table 8).[28] Although ratings for the rest of the criminal justice system were favourable, criminal courts, correctional services and parole were not rated as highly as police.

Table 8: Perception of Job Quality by Local Police, 2004

	Total (000s)	Good Job (%)	Average Job (%)	Poor Job (%)	Don't Know or Not Sure (%)
Enforcing Laws					
Edmonton CMA	806	53	35	7	5
Vancouver CMA	1,811	51	37	7	6
Victoria CMA	270	68	25	n/a	n/a
Non-CMA areas	9,289	59	32	6	4
Responding to Calls					
Edmonton CMA	806	39	29	11	22
Vancouver CMA	1,811	44	27	10	19
Victoria CMA	270	59	18	F	18
Non-CMA areas	9,289	53	24	9	15

Source: Statistics Canada, General Social Survey, Cycle 18

Six out of ten Canadians believe that crime is lower in their neighbourhoods than elsewhere in Canada. The same proportion of Canadians was of the opinion that crime levels in their neighbourhoods had not changed over the past five years. It is not known what proportion of the population are aware of the "crime drop" in the mid-1990s, given the relative improvements across the nation as a whole for most crime categories, and it is possible that the general public are more inclined to take notice of crime and public safety issues in their communities than in the nation as a whole. Contrast these 2004 figures with a national (Angus Reid) poll of Canadians in 1997, which reports that the same proportion – six out of ten – felt that crime in their neighbourhood had *increased* over the previous five years (i.e., 1992-1997).[29]

The GSS notes that 94 percent of the population aged 15 years or older feel safe in most situations. Four out of five people (80 percent) reported that they were not at all worried when home alone at night.

Canadians living in the Atlantic Provinces were generally less fearful of crime. In 2004, 97 percent of residents in Newfoundland and Labrador and 96 percent of residents in Prince Edward Island felt safe walking alone at night, while the same was true for 88 percent of people living in British Columbia and Quebec (see also Box 5).

While fear of crime is generally higher among women than men, the difference has narrowed since 1999. This can be attributed to the fact that women's levels of personal safety have improved, while men's overall feelings of safety and safety in particular situations have only marginally increased or remained unchanged.

Not surprisingly, fear of crime tends to be more pronounced for Canadians who believe they live in a neighbourhood where crime is higher than elsewhere and who think that neighbour-

hood crime has increased in the past five years.

When asked to assess the work of the components of the criminal justice system, the majority of Canadians were satisfied with police. As was the case in previous victimization surveys, opinions of the criminal courts, prison and parole systems were less favourable. Nevertheless, positive assessments of the courts and prisons have generally increased since 1999.

In 2004, there were inter-provincial differences in satisfaction levels with respect to the components of the criminal justice system. While people in the Western provinces were less likely to give positive assessment, confidence levels in these provinces have not worsened; they have either improved or stayed the same, depending upon the criminal justice sector and its functions.

Age plays a role in how Canadians rate the criminal justice system. Positive attitudes toward the police generally increased with age, while favourable perceptions of the courts, prison and parole systems were more common amongst younger Canadians.

Box 5: Public Opinion & Crime

A national Angus Reid poll (1997) reported that nearly one-quarter (22 percent) of Canadians placed crime as a "top-of-mind" issue. This nationally representative poll found regional variation, with the Maritimes and Quebec reporting the least concern (ten percent) and British Columbia the most (42 percent).

A more recent (2004) Ipsos-Reid poll of British Columbians found that two-thirds (67 percent) of residents see crime as a "very serious" or "somewhat serious" problem in their communities, with most concern being directed towards property crimes. Despite this concern, however, British Columbians do not appear to be worried about becoming a victim of crime themselves; two thirds (68 percent) reported that they "only worry a little" (35 percent) or "not at all" (33 percent).

In terms of actual victimization, rates reported in the 1997 poll reported that "personal crime victimization rises in a westward direction across Canada, from one in seven Atlantic Canadians to nearly four in ten British Columbians."

In January 2006, Ipsos-Reid polled a national sample of Canadians to identify their perceptions of causes of gun crime in Canada's cities. Three main issues are reported as the top factors: "gangs" (88 percent), "drugs and drug trafficking" (84 percent), and "judges that are too lenient with criminals convicted of gun crimes" (78 percent).

Sources: Angus Reid Group, July/August 1997; Ipsos-Reid Corporation, March 26, 2004; Ipsos-Reid Corporation, January 6, 2006.

Police satisfaction levels continue to be high, particularly for enforcement, but suffer in comparison with respondents' perceptions that police do not respond as completely or perhaps as quickly as they could. Victoria and, to a slightly lesser extent, the Vancouver CMA, enjoy higher levels on both dimensions than Edmonton. Each of the three CMAs possesses a mix of RCMP and municipal Police Services, with a majority of police-respondent contacts likely involving the municipal service.

Victimization Rates

At the beginning of this report, victimization surveys were identified as a key source of information about the prevalence of crime that may not be captured by police records. Nationally representative polls are the fastest way to capture a part of this picture, although these are often limited to only a handful of questions, and limited information about the

respondent's demographic characteristics. National victimization surveys, such as the General Social Survey, often have a dedicated victimization component. This section reports on the findings of the 2004 cycle of the Canadian GSS.[30]

The GSS uses a different categorization scheme than is found in the UCR, however, a number of key crime types are maintained, such as robbery and break and enter. For the victimization data, total violence experience includes the subcategories of: sexual assault, robbery, and physical assault.[31] British Columbia fares well for this total violence category, with a rate of 108 per 100,000 persons aged 15 or older, compared to Alberta (160), Nova Scotia (157), Manitoba (139), Saskatchewan (112) and Ontario (112).

Given the UCR reported rates for property crime in British Columbia, it is not surprising that this province has the highest provincial rate for theft of personal property, at 127 per 100,000 persons aged 15 and older. Manitoba (106) and Ontario (103) have the next highest rates of reported victimization. Ontario residents report more victimization by personal property theft than one would expect, given the performance of that province using the UCR as a measure; that is, it "jumps" over other provinces, in terms of self-report data. British Columbia's rates of reporting for this category seem consistent with its performance with respect to the UCR. British Columbia also performs as expected for the "total household" crime category, which is comprised of: break and enter, motor vehicle theft (and parts theft), theft of "household property" and vandalism. British Columbia (376 total household crimes per 100,000 persons 15 and over) trails the usual suspects; namely, Manitoba (403 per) and Saskatchewan (406 per 100,000 aged 15 and over).[32]

At the CMA level, total violent victimization rates are highest in Halifax (229 per 100,000 persons aged 15 or more), followed by Edmonton (191), Regina (173), Winnipeg (155) and Victoria (148). Toronto and Vancouver CMA report the same rate, 108 per 100,000 population aged 15 or older, well below most CMAs.[33] Theft of personal property is highest once again in British Columbia (136 per 100,000 population aged 15 or older), but several other CMAs are within five points of this rate, including Winnipeg, Halifax, and Oshawa.

In terms of victim characteristics, young males (15-24 years old), who are more active (those with the most number of activities outside the home per month) are the most likely group to report being victims of violent crime. This demographic also tends to be single, have more discretionary time, lower rates of employment, and report the lowest category of income. This pattern is precisely what analysts would predict, and these characteristics tend to carry over to suspects, with young males between the ages of 18 and 34 being the most likely group to be suspected or charged with violent offences.[34]

As mentioned earlier, the willingness of the public to report their victimization experiences is a vital aspect of any functioning criminal justice system, particularly for those crimes that are only infrequently in public view, such as spousal assaults, the abuse of minors, and frauds. Violent crimes are infrequently reported, with only 34 percent of victimizations being reported to the police. Of the violent categories, robbery has the highest within category reporting rate at 46 percent, and sexual assault the lowest, at an estimated eight percent. Total household offences fare slightly better, at 37 percent. Within household categories of

break and enter (58 percent) and motor vehicle-related crime (49 percent) are the most likely of all specific crime types to be reported to the police.[35]

Aboriginal rates of victimization and involvement in criminal proceedings are notably higher than for non-Aboriginals. The overall criminal victimization rates reported in the 2004 GSS mirror those from the previous GSS in 1999, with Aboriginals reporting approximately three times as many victimization experiences than non-Aboriginals (31,900 versus 10,100 incidences per 100,000 population aged 15 or older). Aboriginal populations tend to be over-represented in a number of socio-demographic characteristics that are associated with increased rates of both victimization and criminal involvement.

Although Aboriginal ancestry is reported in only 3 percent of the population, Aboriginal people comprise 17 percent of all victims of homicide. Similarly, where the ethnicity of the offender is known, Aboriginals are charged in over 20 percent of homicides. A number of factors have been identified as possible explanations for the unequal rates of involvement as both victims and offenders across the major crime categories. Aboriginal populations are younger, have higher unemployment rates, lower incomes, and report lower levels of educational attainment. There is also evidence that Aboriginal children living in urban areas tend to be from single parent households more frequently (46 percent) than non-Aboriginal children (18 percent).

Summary of Key Findings

In 1995, among the provinces, British Columbia had among the highest rates of crime in Canada. Over the past ten years, crime rates in British Columbia have been improving overall and for each of the major crime categories: violent, property and other crimes. British Columbia's relative position within Canada is improving, but it still lags behind the Canadian rate for all major categories. For example, British Columbia is still last among the provinces for drug-related offences although this may be a product of police enforcement activity rather than a measure of the actual amount of crime with respect to drugs. British Columbia's rate of total drug offences (607 per 100,000 population) is nearly double that of Saskatchewan (310 per 100,000), the next highest province.

The CMA and municipal crime rates for Vancouver and Victoria, reflect, for the most part, the provincial trends. Property crime is down for both Vancouver and Victoria at the CMA level at -29 and -21 percent, respectively, and in this regard is almost keeping pace with the national reduction in property crime rates (down 25 percent). Between 2004 and 2005, Vancouver improved the most of all the CMAs with at least 500,000 population in the motor vehicle theft category, with a 13.4 percent reduction. Vancouver also posted a strong reduction in break and enters. Robbery rates also show Vancouver is improving although they remain well above many other provincial and CMA robbery rates.

It appears that British Columbia has typically higher property offences than not only most provinces in Canada, but also its nearest neighbours in the North West United States. British Columbia's rates for break and enter and robbery are also higher than Oregon and Washington. Homicide rates trends are similar for British Columbia and Oregon and Washington,

although BC's is lower (roughly 2.3 per 100,000 population) than Washington's (3.3) and Oregon's (3.0 per 100,000). Motor vehicle theft runs somewhat contrary to this general pattern, with Washington State showing a rising trend over recent years, effectively catching up with British Columbia's rate (784 and 818 per 100,000, respectively). Oregon trends similar to the Canadian rate of approximately 530 vehicle thefts per 100,000 persons.

British Columbia's robbery rate is well above Oregon state (109 to 68 per 100,000), but similar to Washington (92 per 100,000 population).

For 2005, the Seattle Metropolitan Statistical Area had an identical homicide rate to the Vancouver CMA at 2.9 incidents per 100,000 population. Oregon's homicide rate is similar to that for British Columbia (2.2 and 2.3 respectively). British Columbia's 2005 homicide rate is slightly above the national rate (2.0), but well below Manitoba (4.2) and Saskatchewan (4.3).

Public opinion polls (1997-2006) show that British Columbia and the West see crime as more of a problem than do the Eastern provinces. Property crime is the primary type of crime in the minds of Canadians, and British Columbians specifically. The most active persons are at the highest risk of victimization. Urban populations are also more concerned about crime and more likely to become victimized.

Aboriginal rates of victimization and involvement in criminal proceedings are notably higher than for non-Aboriginals. Aboriginals report approximately three times as many victimization experiences than non-Aboriginals (31,900 versus 10,100 incidences per 100,000 population).

The general youth crime rates follow the general crime rate "drop" in the early 1990s. Nationally, youth charge rates are substantially higher than for adults, especially for property offences. There is no appreciable difference between charge rates for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal youth.

Although Aboriginal ancestry is reported in only 3 percent of the population, Aboriginal people comprise 17 percent of all victims of homicide. Similarly, where the ethnicity of the offender is known, Aboriginals are charged in over 20 percent of homicides. A number of factors have been identified as possible explanations for the unequal rates of involvement as both victims and offenders across the major crime categories. Aboriginals tend to report having lower levels of socio-economic factors, such as household income and educational attainment.

The next section outlines a number of possible ways in which to further reduce crime in British Columbia.

III. REDUCING THE RATES OF CRIME AND VICTIMIZATION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

There are two ways in which British Columbia's crime and victimization rates may be reduced: (i) by identifying and tackling the primary causes of crime in the province; and (ii) by identifying and correcting the inefficiencies in the provincial criminal justice system that may, directly and indirectly, be contributing to criminal activity. A criminal justice system that is weak and inefficient, or perceived to be weak and inefficient, will exert less general deterrence than a criminal justice system that is strong and efficient, or at least appears to be that way. Generally, a criminal justice system that offers offenders, or potential offenders, a high probability of detection, conviction and punishment if and when they commit crimes is going to be a stronger general deterrent than a system that is disorganized, ineffective in arresting and convicting offenders, and weak and inconsistent in the area of sentencing.

The following discussion is divided into two sections: an analysis of the primary causes of crime in British Columbia, and a parallel analysis of the main areas of inefficiency affecting the criminal justice system. In both sections, the information upon which the discussions are based has been drawn from research reports and other literature as well as conversations with key government, criminal justice, academic and business leaders and experts in the province. The names and affiliations of these individuals are listed in Appendix B to this report.

The Primary Causes of Crime and Victimization in British Columbia

There appear to be four *primary* causes of crime in British Columbia (i.e., key factors underlying criminal behaviour) which, if addressed effectively, will likely result in significant reductions in the rates of property and violent crime and victimization. There are, of course, other reasons why crime occurs (e.g., rational choice on the part of some property offenders, or uncontrolled sexual urges on the part of some sex offenders), but the factors itemized below stand out because they were consistently identified by the individuals consulted for this study. These factors are as follows: (i) widespread substance abuse and the activities of the criminal business organizations involved in the illegal drug trade that, in part, feed substance abuse; (ii) defective and/or deficient childhood development; (iii) mental disorder, including cognitive impairments such as brain injuries and fetal alcohol spectrum disorder; and, (iv) the impoverished and unstable lifestyles experienced by many individuals living in inner urban areas. Each will be examined in turn.

Substance Abuse and the Illegal Drug Trade

There seems to be a consensus that both the violent crime and the property crime rates in British Columbia, and the associated rates of reported victimization, are being driven significantly by substance abuse (i.e., abuse of both alcohol and illegal drugs), and by the trade in illegal drugs. In addition, the failure of all levels of government to address both the drug trade and substance abuse effectively may also be having an adverse impact upon public

impressions of, and respect for, the criminal justice system.

There are two main fields of *illegal* activity associated with substance abuse: the production and distribution of illegal drugs of various kinds; and the consumption of both alcohol and illegal drugs by individuals in such quantities that conventional restraints on their behaviour are adversely affected. This may result in reckless, uncontrolled and, in some cases, aggressive behaviour that may include criminal acts. In addition, a profound addiction to drugs such as crack cocaine may dominate a person's life to such an extent that their capacities to carry out basic daily living activities and to acquire and hold regular employment are significantly undermined. Property crime, and to some extent violent crime, follow as addicted individuals struggle to acquire the financial resources necessary to feed their habits.

It is widely acknowledged that British Columbia has become the chosen location for criminal business organizations involved in the illegal drug trade and that an extensive and growing system of manufacture, supply and distribution has taken root in the province. Much of this activity apparently centres on the production and local distribution of marijuana, and the export of the product (colloquially referred to as "B.C. Bud") to markets in the United States and elsewhere. The trade, however, involves other illegal drugs such as crack cocaine and so-called "crystal meth" some of which is purported to flow north into British Columbia from the United States as part of a complex and low-visibility form of free trade involving drugs, firearms and currency. Suffice it to say the illegal drug trade is an inherently criminal activity that is a huge, organized, and extremely profitable industry which is unlikely to disappear any time soon due, in part, to the high demand for its products.

Associated criminal activities include: the violent resolution of inter-organizational disputes and disputes involving components of organizations; the use of violence to impose discipline within organizations; the use of violence to eliminate competitors and/or to seize a competitor's product (e.g., the so-called "grow rips"); property crimes such as the theft of electricity to run illegal laboratories and marijuana grow operations; and, possibly, the corruption by bribery of key individuals within the criminal justice system and other related government agencies and organizations. The list is not exhaustive and the specific criminal activities include murder, severe beatings, drive-by shootings, home invasions, and kidnappings. While some of these events have been high profile and have led to public outcry (e.g., the murders of young Indo-Canadian males over a period of several years), it is believed that many of the activities have not been reported to police.

Not included in the list of problem activities associated with the illegal drug trade is a range of public health, public safety, and property damage issues connected to illegal laboratories and marijuana grow operations. In addition, the firearms that are purportedly acquired as a result of exports of drugs to the United States (a barter system is said to be in operation) are presumably marketed separately and are no doubt used in other, unrelated crimes such as robberies.[36]

The size and scope of the illegal drug trade are hard to estimate. The Organized Crime Agency and related law enforcement units believe there are about 126 organized crime groups operating in British Columbia of which only about one quarter are under active investigation, primarily because of the Agency's limited budget. Investigations into organized criminal activity are usually complex and extremely time consuming, and therefore require a significant commitment of

resources. Of the five main projects reported by the Agency in 2004/2005, each was related to the illegal drug trade and to associated activities such as money-laundering and weapons possession.[37]

The number and value of illegal drug operations is, for obvious reasons, hard to gauge.[38] Easton estimated that in the early 2000s the police destroyed nearly 3,000 marijuana operations per year, that each modest operation consisting of 100 plants yielded 13 kilograms of product that sold for about $2,600 per pound, generating just under $20,000 per harvest.[39] Assuming four harvests per year (the crop is produced using hydroponic methods and is, therefore, not affected by seasonal variations) the gross revenue from one modest, 100-plant operation is estimated to be $80,000 (about $55,000 net in a worst case scenario). Easton estimated there were as many as 17,500 grow operations in the province (probably a much higher number by now) valued at nearly $2 billion; a not insignificant component of the provincial economy and an industry that is operating tax-free. Some estimates place the total underground economy at 12-15 percent of provincial GDP.[40] Recent research finds that nearly 40 percent of all marijuana production cases reported to Statistics Canada were found in British Columbia. In terms of real numbers, British Columbia experienced a 209 percent increase in the number of "grow ops" between 1997 and 2000 (from approximately 1,500 to over 4,800 cases). From 2001 to 2003, however, the number of confirmed marijuana production cases has dropped to approximately 4,500 per year.[41]

Although a proportion of the product flowing from the illegal drug trade is exported, a great deal is marketed within the province and, in conjunction with its close but legally produced and marketed cousin – alcohol – contributes to crime and victimization. Chronic abusers of both drugs and alcohol populate most urban centres in the province but seem to be most visible, and troublesome, in the inner city core of Vancouver and, to a lesser extent, in suburban areas such as Surrey and New Westminster, and other cities such as Victoria. The problems experienced, and created, by chronic abusers are significant. They are also well documented and have been the focus of numerous studies and recommendations, the most high profile of these being the so-called "Four Pillars" approach adopted by the City of Vancouver (Box 6).

The extent to which, and the ways in which, chronic abusers contribute to the property and violent crime rates is also well documented.[42] Substance abusers will engage in property crime (e.g., break and enters and thefts, including thefts from automobiles) to feed their habits and to meet their daily living needs. They will engage in violence to protect their limited assets from other substance abusers. They prey upon others, and are themselves preyed upon by unscrupulous individuals who are eager to separate them from their social assistance benefits and other limited assets. A trade in stolen goods has grown up around chronic abusers that, in some instances, presents a legitimate business façade. Indeed, the lines between the operation of businesses in "second hand" goods and organized fencing operations have, in many instances, become significantly blurred.

The beneficiaries of all of this appear to be those who sell alcohol (legally and illegally) which, ironically, includes the Government of British Columbia, those who produce and sell illegal drugs, and those who run businesses buying and selling stolen property (i.e., "second hand goods"). The losers are those who have been separated from their personal possessions in break and enters and thefts from automobiles, the insurance companies who make good the losses to

Box 6: City of Vancouver "Four Pillars Drug Strategy"

The Four Pillars Drug Strategy is the City of Vancouver's policy and plan for reducing drug-related harm in Vancouver. The "four pillars" of the City's drug policy are:

- **Harm Reduction** - reducing the spread of deadly communicable diseases, preventing drug overdose deaths, increasing substance users' contact with health care services and drug treatment programs, and reducing consumption of drugs in the street;
- **Prevention** - using a variety of strategies to help people understand substance misuse, the negative health impacts and legal risks associated with substance use and abuse, encouraging people to make healthy choices, and providing opportunities to help reduce the likelihood of substance abuse, including affordable housing, employment training and jobs, recreation and long-term economic development;
- **Treatment** - offering individuals access to services that help people come to terms with substance misuse and lead healthier lives, including outpatient and peer-based counseling, methadone programs, daytime and residential treatment, housing support, and ongoing medical care; and,
- **Enforcement** - recognizing the need for peace and quiet, public order and safety in the Downtown Eastside and other Vancouver neighbourhoods by targeting organized crime, drug dealing, drug houses, problem businesses involved in the drug trade, and improving coordination with health services and other agencies that link drug users to withdrawal management (detox), treatment, counseling and prevention services.

This framework supports the City of Vancouver's drug policy, which is premised on five prevention priorities: reducing risk factors and increasing protective factors across the life course; community centred prevention; addressing impacts on communities; legislative and public policy change; and regulated markets.

Source: http://www.city.vancouver.bc.ca/fourpillars/

the victims, the victims who have to pay higher insurance premiums as a consequence, and the chronic substance abusers who continue along their self destructive paths.

The greatest concentration of chronic abusers appears to be in the inner urban core of Vancouver. The plight of these individuals is marked by a combination of factors that create lives in which low level criminal activity is a constant. More will be said about this group in the discussion below of the relationship between criminality and impoverished and unstable lifestyles.

In many respects, the situation in the Downtown Eastside area of Vancouver is a special case and there is a danger that this high profile and noisy phenomenon will be viewed as representative of the crime problem throughout the province. There is more to crime in British Columbia than the goings-on at Hastings and Main. Substance abuse occurs amongst individuals from every social stratum living in an array of social and domestic circumstances and, to the extent that it lowers inhibitions and generates aggression, may be viewed as a potential cause of crime generally. The possession and use of illegal drugs may be crimes in themselves but, that issue aside, drugs and alcohol may also be contributing factors in crimes of violence and, in some instances, property crimes.

Significantly, federal and provincial corrections officials have noted that substance abuse is a factor in the backgrounds of a high percentage of offenders (about 80 percent in the federal correctional system and about 59 percent in the provincial system), and that the proportion of inmates addicted to drugs and/or alcohol is increasing. Not all of these individuals are coming from the

Downtown Eastside of Vancouver.

Substance abuse also plays a role in defective childhood development practices, a criminogenic factor that is the topic of the next section.

Defective and/or Deficient Childhood Development

There is little doubt that criminal behaviour does not begin abruptly in an individual's life. The behaviour develops gradually over a person's life course starting with his or her early life experiences and either strengthens or weakens with the passage of time and exposure to a variety of life factors. Nothing is preordained, in that even the most horrendous social and domestic circumstances seem to be surmountable given appropriate and timely interventions that enable an individual to identify and follow a different life course.[43]

Nevertheless, there is a consensus that defective and/or deficient childhood development is a significant factor in accounting for an individual's criminality. The deficiencies can be traced to defective parenting practices including practices during pregnancy. The deficiencies may be biological in nature, as is the case with individuals with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD), or they may be social psychological in nature, as is the case with individuals with attachment disorders.[44] Sometimes, these factors operate in conjunction with each other and with other variables to produce a complex, negative, childhood environment from which a child or young person is unable to extract him or herself and that will have a lasting impact on the individual.

The factors may be listed as follows:

- Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, which may result in learning disabilities, impulsivity, and other behavioural problems such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder;
- Attachment disorders, resulting from factors such as weak child-parent bonding, defective socialization, abuse and/or neglect, and frequent apprehensions by child protection authorities followed by multiple placements in temporary care situations;
- Physical and/or sexual abuse, the negative mental health consequences of which are only slowly emerging but that may be related to aggression and the abuse (especially sexual abuse) of others by victims in later years; and,
- Neglect, including emotional neglect, which may affect both the nature and strength of positive attachments and the processes of moral development and positive social learning (e.g., through strong, positive role models).

These factors, especially in combination, may establish a particular life course that primes an infant or young child for criminal behaviour.[45] Such behaviour may appear at any stage during childhood and almost certainly by the time he or she reaches early adolescence. A child who has experienced defective childhood development will probably exhibit behavioural and learning problems in elementary school and, later, in high school. He or she may begin to experiment with alcohol and drugs, and gravitate towards a peer group that favours criminal rather than non-criminal activities, which provides the child or young person with support and that models and reinforces criminality. An individual who has criminal associates is more at risk of engaging in criminal behaviour than someone who does not; indeed, the presence of criminal associates in an individual's life is viewed as a strong predictor of criminality.[46]

Those working within the correctional system, especially probation and parole officers, are usually fully acquainted with the life course patterns of their clients, many of which follow the track set out above, and recognize the need for timely and appropriate interventions, preferably at an early stage. A failure to intervene effectively results in a drift into criminality that often terminates in the federal correctional system. Both provincial and federal facilities house individuals whose antecedents reflect a tragically predictable life course filled with factors such as poverty, dysfunctional family structure, homelessness, poor education, unemployment, and substance abuse, usually in combination, much of which can be traced back to defective childhood development. These individuals often live unstable and impoverished lifestyles marked by poor problem solving skills, cognitive disorders, and substance abuse. Federal and provincial correctional programming is purportedly geared towards addressing these practical and cognitive challenges, but the extent to which it succeeds is not clear.[47]

Mental Disorder and Crime

The term "mental disorder" includes psychiatric disorders, and cognitive impairments such as brain injuries and fetal alcohol spectrum disorder that affect a person's capacity to manage themselves and their affairs independently and to fully understand the nature and consequences of their behaviour.

Corrections personnel, both federal and provincial, report the presence of increasingly disproportionate numbers of mentally disordered offenders in corrections facilities and community programmes who have been convicted of an array of violent crimes and property crimes.[48] While some mentally disordered offenders are charged and convicted of serious crimes such as murder, by and large their crimes are relatively "ordinary." They steal from others, use drugs, become involved in altercations and, sometimes, commit sexual offences. Medication-based community care and treatment helps to control the symptoms of mental illnesses but a failure to maintain a medication regime may result in decompensation during which the individual gradually loses control over his or her behaviour leading to a variety of behaviours that may include criminal acts. For those with cognitive impairments such as brain injuries, some conventional cognitive processes may be absent or reduced along with the conventional restraints on behaviour.[49] Again, the absence of internalized behavioural controls may lead to a variety of undesirable behaviours that may include criminal acts. It is important to note, however, that it is unclear whether the rates of criminality are higher amongst those with mental disorders than the general population, or whether they are more likely to be processed by the criminal justice system.

It is generally believed that the non-institutionalization and de-institutionalization policies affecting the mentally ill and developmentally disabled that have been in place for several decades have resulted in mentally disordered individuals who exhibit behavioural problems entering the criminal justice system because there are no other alternatives.[50] By all accounts, efforts are made to keep them out of the criminal justice system if at all possible by using diversion and other alternative measures. Unfortunately, however, the options are limited. Hospitalization is strongly discouraged except in the most acute cases, and there are insufficient community care and treatment resources to meet their needs. Mentally disordered offenders are frequent visitors to the criminal justice system, which has acquired all the qualities of a revolving door.[51]

The provincial Corrections Branch, for example, estimates that in 2004/2005, 62.5 percent of offenders under supervision have some form of behavioural or emotional problem for which they require assistance. Of these about 11 percent have severe problems and are in need of significant assistance.

While no one is advocating a policy of re-institutionalization it is clear that the transfer of the mentally disordered from institutions to the community has not occurred without a hitch. The transfer has not, for example, been supported by the resources and programmes needed for an effective system of community care and treatment and, as a result, the criminal justice system has picked up the slack.

Mentally disordered persons are not only entering the criminal justice system because of community management problems, they are also becoming involved because of victimization. This is an extremely vulnerable group that may also be a multi-problem group. In addition to having one or more mental disorders that may manifest themselves at the most inconvenient moments and cause fear and distress in others, members of the group may also abuse drugs and/or alcohol, be homeless and living in abject poverty, and exhibit a range of physical health problems all of which exposes them to a higher risk of victimization. Policies of de-institutionalization and non-institutionalization have worked well for the vast majority of people with mental disorders but, for some, the retention of a modicum of institutional care may have been a better alternative.

Impoverished and Unstable Lifestyles

The populations of both the federal and the provincial correctional centres in the province include a percentage of individuals who are referred to, quite candidly, as the "unfixables." These are chronic, multi problem, prolific offenders who, upon their release, will likely re-offend and re-appear in facilities within a short space of time. They are the core recidivists for whom very little can be done because, for example, of an addiction coupled with organic brain damage, an untreatable sexual disorder, or simply disinterest in another, more productive lifestyle. This is a group that may be responsible for a disproportionately large amount of property crime and, to a lesser extent, violent crime in the province, particularly in urban and inner urban areas. Corrections personnel indicate that these individuals lead impoverished and unstable lives marked by economic disadvantage, educational disadvantage, poor physical and mental health, unemployment, chaotic and disintegrated family situations, homelessness, cognitive deficiency particularly with respect to their attitudes and expectations, and substance abuse.

There seems to be general agreement that the greatest concentration of individuals in this category is to be found in the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver, in some suburban centres such as Surrey and New Westminster, and in the urban core of Victoria. There is little doubt that these individuals, in particular, are characterized by several, sometimes all, of the following: drug abuse; alcohol abuse; mental disorder; poor physical health; homelessness; unemployment; poverty; criminal activity and victimization; and, hopelessness.

The various strategies for dealing with this group have recently been reviewed by the Street Crime Working Group of the BC Justice Review Task Force. A report released by the Working Group in 2005 describes the nature and scope of the problem and makes several valuable recommendations.

The following are some highlights from the report:

- About 70 percent of adult street crime offenders are chronic re-offenders charged with five or more offences in a year;
- The predominant crime is property crime, committed to support a drug addiction;
- Offenders fail to make scheduled appearances in court resulting in heavy and unproductive work loads in the court system;
- Drug and alcohol addictions, mental illnesses, and homelessness are related and contribute to visible public disorder and street crime; and,
- Health and justice system responses are ineffective, in part because of a lack of coordination.

The Working Group's recommendations include the following:

- The creation of a Community Court in Vancouver, as an alternative to processing chronic offenders through the conventional Provincial Court system (Box 7);
- An integration of the criminal justice, health and social service systems e-linked to the Community Court to ensure that offenders, most of whom have colossal unmet needs, are provided with adequate and effective "wraparound services" on a "one stop" basis; and,
- The use of a triage approach to the management of chronic offenders that will ensure an effective diversion of individuals to appropriate services in the first instance.

Box 7: Community Courts

There are number of Community Courts in the United States (e.g., the Midtown Community Court in Manhattan, NY), and in the United Kingdom (e.g., the Community Justice Centre in Liverpool). A Neigbourhood Justice Centre is scheduled to open in Australia in 2007. In October 2005, the BC Justice Review Task Force recommended that Vancouver create its own Community Court, which would be the first in the country.

Community Courts are typically responsible for relatively minor "street crime" offences, such as simple drug possession, shoplifting, trespassing, and administrative offences, such as violations of bail or parole conditions. Aimed at reducing the burden imposed on the Provincial and Supreme Courts by chronic offenders, and the offences associated with persons living on the street (prostitution, disturbing the peace, etc.). Community Courts are able to provide more structured community service support, such as rehabilitation and job-skills programmes. Community Courts also provide direction for existing community resources, such as housing or employment services, often mandating their use when determining sentences for the guilty party, as well as assisting with the coordination of key contacts within the community to ensure that resources are made available and that the Court's orders are being observed.

Source: http://www.co.multnomah.or.us/dcj/acjccourt.shtml; http://www.bcjusticereview.org/working_groups/street_crime/street_crime.asp

The thoroughness of the Working Group's Report, and the extensive work that underpins it, leaves little room for improvement or doubt about the direction that provincial agencies should take. Consequently, the needs and impact of chronic offenders will not be reviewed further in this report. We will briefly return to some of the recommendations of the Working Group later in this document.

Conclusion

This section has identified and briefly reviewed the primary causes of crime in the province at this time. If each area of concern is addressed there is little doubt that the rates of reported crime and victimization will fall even further than they have over the past few years. More importantly, the amount of violent and property crime occurring in the province will fall in real, as opposed to merely reported, terms. In each case, though, and because of the entrenched nature of the problem, some time will pass before the impacts of changes are felt. This is particularly true in the case of interventions aimed at deficient or defective childhood development. An infusion of family supports and services by the Ministry of Children and Family Development will have significant impacts almost immediately but because of the young age of the recipients it will be some time before the changes affect rates of crime and victimization.

We turn now to an examination of the criminal justice system and to the inefficiencies that may, directly and indirectly, have an impact on rates of crime and victimization.

Inefficiencies in the Provincial Criminal Justice System

From our review, it is clear that the criminal justice system in British Columbia is facing numerous challenges, many of which are not peculiar to the province. These include:

- The need to address the high personnel attrition and slow recruitment rates within key components of the system, especially police, and the corresponding loss of expertise;
- Developing strategies and programmes that will address the over-representation of Aboriginal offenders in the criminal justice system including Aboriginal justice programmes that include the use of healing circles;[52]
- Improving the quality and effectiveness of programmes within the provincial and federal correctional systems by, for example, introducing apprenticeships in the trades that will equip inmates with high value, marketable skills upon their release and reduce the likelihood of recidivism;
- Prison overcrowding leading to double-bunking, especially in the provincial correctional system where double-bunking has almost reached 100 percent;
- The problematic practice of releasing inmates from correctional centres without adequate, temporary financial support and other forms of basic assistance; and,
- The development of effective alternatives to the use of the conventional retributive criminal justice system including the development of restorative justice approaches and programmes for both young and adult offenders.

As we have seen in the preceding section of this report, the primary causes of crime in the province include substance abuse and addictions, and mental disorder. Policy decisions have been made by successive governments at the provincial level about the management of those with addictions and those with mental disorders that has resulted in these two groups being regulated primarily by the criminal justice, rather than the health care, system. The end result is writ large on the streets of the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver, and in other urban centres around the province.

There is little doubt that criminal justice practitioners, administrators and policy-makers are well aware of the challenges facing the provincial criminal justice system, and that efforts are being made to address key problems. The relevant government ministries are tackling issues such as how best to deal with chronic offenders, improved information sharing through the Police Records Information Management Environment (PRIME) system, and prison overcrowding. The police are attempting to address the challenges of law enforcement across a vast and diverse geographical area, and especially in the larger urban areas where a functional integration of police services is temporarily shoring up a balkanized system that should be regionalized. Crown Corporations like ICBC have created solid partnerships with the police and have had success with initiatives such as the Bait Car programme. As well, non-government organizations such as the BC Crime Prevention Association and the Downtown Vancouver Business Improvement Area are making major contributions to crime reduction, particularly in the area of crime prevention.

Of all of these problems and challenges, three clusters stand out. These clusters of problems were consistently identified by the individuals consulted for this report, regardless of where they were working within the criminal justice system:

(i) The apparent failure of the criminal justice apparatus to ensure that offenders face the consequences of their behaviour;

(ii) A failure to guarantee the speedy and fair disposition of cases once an offender is identified, to ensure that justice is swift, sure and effective; and,

(iii) The problem of inter-agency and inter-ministry barriers and disorganization (the silo, or separate solitudes, problem).

If these challenges can be addressed successfully there will be a major and positive impact upon the criminal justice system and, in all probability, eventually upon the rates of crime and victimization in the province.

The Lack of Consequences

There is a widespread perception that the criminal justice apparatus is failing to ensure that offenders face the full consequences of their behaviour. This problem is manifest in several areas of the criminal justice system from apprehension through the final disposition of a case by the courts, to the management of offenders within the correctional system. The following are some examples:

- A failure to respond when an individual who is granted bail breaches the conditions of bail or fails to appear. For example, funds are not being confiscated and sureties are not being held to account when bail is breached;
- A failure to hold offenders to account when they breach the conditions of their probation and other orders;
- A failure to provide appropriate supervision of those sentenced to community based dispositions (e.g., community service orders), or who are given a conditional sentence;
- A failure to enforce arrest warrants issued in other jurisdictions, partly because of fugitive return policies in those jurisdictions;

- Lenient sentencing, or at least a widespread perception that the courts in British Columbia are generally easier on offenders than their counterparts in the rest of Canada and especially in neighbouring jurisdictions;
- An apparent manipulation of the remand and bail systems whereby a person remanded in custody receives a two for one "credit" for time served while remanded in custody. This is apparently leading to a reduction in requests for bail on the part of those who anticipate a term of imprisonment and is also driving a dramatic increase in overcrowding in remand centres;
- Crown Counsel failing to proceed with cases, or opting to divert cases, primarily because of system convenience or expediency rather than the merits of the case;
- Police officers choosing non-intervention, or soft intervention, alternatives for offenders because of the workload associated with processing an arrest (e.g., issuing roadside suspensions for drunk driving rather than prosecuting the offender);
- Plea-bargaining practices that result in diminished sentences for crimes that should receive harsher punishments, primarily because of workload pressures in the court and correctional systems; and,
- A failure to impose progressively harsher penalties on those who habitually re-offend and who clearly are not affected by the punishments that are imposed for their crimes.

The reasons for these failures are, to some extent, tied to resource issues. The relevant Ministries have had to prioritize their activities and services within reduced budgets and this has created a need to focus on the most serious crimes and the most serious offenders.

In the provincial Corrections Branch, for example, significant budget reductions occurred about four years ago. The Community Corrections budget was reduced by $6 million (from a $40 million base) and this had an impact on a major restructuring of the Branch that had been underway since 1997. Branch personnel had to prioritize service delivery by risk, and services to low risk individuals were reduced. While this may have been necessary and acceptable in the short-term, and while it may have encouraged the development and use of innovative correctional strategies, in the long-term the effect is unacceptable. After a while, those who are inclined to commit crimes – both neophytes and old hands – learn that the consequences will be minimal and the deterrent effect evaporates. The criminal justice system and its personnel, become, in effect, a "joke."

Sentencing practices are, clearly, a major issue for many criminal justice practitioners especially the police. This is not surprising given the tendency for police to subscribe heavily to a "just deserts" model of justice. There is some evidence that police officers investigating crimes involving cross jurisdictional activity prefer to organize the arrest and prosecution of offenders outside of British Columbia because the province's judiciary are seen as being "soft" on certain kinds of offenders and offences, notably those associated with the illegal drug trade. It is, perhaps, significant that the recent successful prosecution of the individuals responsible for digging a tunnel under the international border for the purposes of smuggling drugs were arrested, prosecuted and sentenced in Washington State rather than British Columbia. Similarly, a recent (2005) study of bank robberies in Vancouver, conducted by the Canadian Bankers' Association, argues that the

city has the worst robbery rate of any city in Canada. Substance abuse is seen as a major contributing factor and the judicial response is weaker than anywhere else in the country, in part because of the substance abuse issue. According to the Association's report, a similar pattern exists with other commercial robberies such as convenience store "hold-ups".[53]

It is extremely hard to draw conclusions about sentencing in the absence of reliable and national comparative data on the judiciary's sentencing practices. However, a perception of leniency (read "weakness") is firmly in place and, arguably, that is all that is required to erode the general deterrent effect of the courts and the correctional system.

The Speedy and Fair Disposition of Cases

Justice in British Columbia is far from being swift and sure, let alone certain. Indeed, the processing of offenders, especially from arrest to final court disposition, is cumbersome and extraordinarily bureaucratic. There appear to be two particularly challenging bottlenecks: the approval of charges by Crown Counsel following the arrest of an individual by the police; and, the number of Provincial Court appearances that are required before a case is concluded.

The practice of Crown being required to approve charges before an offender proceeds to court is apparently peculiar to British Columbia. The history and purpose of the policy is unclear although it is believed to have been introduced in the early 1980s. The effect of the practice is to insert a significant layer of bureaucracy between the arrest of an offender by police and the person's first appearance in court. In short, police have to present their case to Crown in the form of a Report to Crown Counsel, which is then reviewed and a decision made about whether to actually proceed further with a prosecution. Crown Counsel follows provincially established guidelines designed to impose some rigor on the process and will only approve charges if there is a reasonable likelihood of conviction and if the prosecution is in the public interest.

There is little doubt that the Crown approval requirement slows down the processing of offenders significantly. It also has a negative impact on police morale and probably leads to police selecting non-intervention or soft intervention (e.g., diversion) options when the offence should be pursued more vigorously. While Crown Counsel involvement is of the utmost importance in cases of serious crime (cases must be prepared and prosecuted properly to ensure convictions) it is doubtful whether there is any real value in such involvement in most minor criminal cases. Arguably, police should have the discretion to lay charges at the time of arrest (and afterwards in situations where a post arrest investigation continues) and to conduct a prosecution at the Provincial Court level. The case could be presented by the arresting officer, a supervisor such as a sergeant, or by a lawyer or para-legal attached to the police station or detachment.

Certainly, an initiative of this kind requires considerable preparation and a pilot or demonstration project, as well as clear parameters. Police officers are more highly educated now than in the early 1980s when it is believed the charge approval process was introduced and, with some additional training, are probably quite capable of conducting simple prosecutions. The impact upon police morale is likely to be significant in part because they will no longer experience the frustration of having Crown decline to proceed against offenders they have arrested, often without any explanation for the decision.

While a reduction in the role of Crown Counsel in the charge approval process could speed up the arrest and charge processes, it is unlikely to resolve one of the major problems with the Provincial Court system: delays caused by multiple appearances.

The average number of court appearances required before a case is concluded is increasing, especially in some courts such as the Vancouver Provincial Court on Main Street. At present, and on average in the province, 7.6 appearances are required before a case is finally concluded. The average at the Provincial Court on Main Street is 14 appearances per case.[54] Optimally, and in a criminal justice system that is swift, sure and certain only one appearance would be necessary and final disposition would occur as quickly after arrest as possible. Clearly, this is not happening.

There are several reasons for the multiple appearances:

- The need to set bail and/or to remand the offender in custody until both the Crown and the defence are ready to proceed;
- The requirement that offenders be allowed to obtain and instruct legal counsel (usually through the provincial legal aid system) who then needs time to prepare a defence;
- The requirement, prescribed by the Supreme Court of Canada in *R. v. Stinchcombe* that the Crown disclose its case in full to the defence before a plea is taken, the matter is heard and a final disposition occurs (see Box 8); and,
- Numerous appearances that turn out to be non-appearances by an accused who fails to appear, who may then be arrested on a warrant issued by the court, only to make (or forget to make) another appearance, and so on, seemingly *ad infinitum*.

Those responsible for the operation of the court system are clearly aware of the problem of multiple appearances and are searching for solutions to what is an extremely complex, multi-layered problem. It is believed, for example, that the current system inadvertently rewards delay and this is encouraging a range of related practices. Lawyers, including legal aid lawyers, are reimbursed for appearances (i.e., inputs) rather than being rewarded for concluding cases (i.e., outcomes). The accused benefit from delay when they have been remanded in custody because the time

Box 8: R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.

The right of an accused to a proper defence in Canada requires that the Crown disclose all relevant material to the accused whether or not the materials will be introduced as evidence at trial and whether or not the evidence is favourable to the accused. This obligation flowed from the right of an accused to make "full answer and defence," itself a constitutionally protected right under Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Crown has a legal duty to disclose all relevant information to the defence, yet limited the obligation to disclose. The Crown can exercise discretion with respect to the withholding of information, the relevance of information, and to the timing and manner of disclosure, and must respect the rules of privilege and to protect the identity of informers. This obligation extends only to materials in the possession or control of the Crown.

While it has been argued that the judgment provides little guidance as to the meaning of "relevance," giving the Crown potentially wide discretionary powers to withhold information, the obligation to disclose has been construed broadly by Canadian courts. This construction has created significant challenges for the Crown as proper disclosure requires managing vast quantities of information within the justice system, some of which is complicated by a high degree of sensitivity, including privacy concerns, and the need to protect victims.

served in custody counts towards a subsequent term of imprisonment at a rate of two for one (i.e., one day on remand is the equivalent of two days in prison). Disclosure rules require that Crown assume that every case will go to trial and, consequently, a great deal of time and effort is poured into preparing a prosecution case regardless of the probable outcome. This is extraordinarily wasteful given that only a small percentage of cases actually go to trial (about five percent).

Some of the problems associated with multiple appearances, and especially in Vancouver, should disappear with the introduction of the proposed Community Court. The proposed procedure requires that the matter be dealt with by the second appearance failing which the case will be referred to the conventional court system and the advantages to the accused will be lost. Other suggested solutions include the introduction of "Night Courts" (more accurately, "Evening and Weekend Courts") that make full use of courthouse buildings that would otherwise stand unused, and the introduction of a public defender system that would enable several steps in the appearance process to be combined and, thereby, speed up the disposal of cases.

Inter-Agency and Inter-Ministry Barriers and Disorganization

It is often said that crime occurs most frequently in socially disorganized areas and that such disorganization is, therefore, a cause of crime. Arguably, *bureaucratic* disorganization may be having a similar impact.

The "silo," or "separate solitudes," problem is a major challenge in British Columbia not only within the criminal justice system but also with respect to the intersections between the system and other related systems such as health and social services. This is, in part, due to the fact that the criminal justice system is not the responsibility of a single Ministry. Instead, three Ministries – Attorney General, Public Safety and Solicitor General, and Children and Family Development – have primary responsibility for components of the system. While many of the disjunctures that occur in practice are addressed effectively at the field level by personnel acting with good will, particularly in smaller communities, at higher levels cross system communication, planning and operations are not high priorities. One outcome is a criminal justice system that is less effective than it could be.

For some, the criminal justice system is not a system at all. Instead, it is a collection of systems the activities of which intersect at key points to produce an illusion that the whole has a common direction and purpose. Yet, it is clear that the four main components of criminal justice – police, Crown prosecutors, courts, and corrections – maintain their own solitudes, each with its own occupational culture and elaborate set of rationales built upon the sanctity of independence. Arguably, this is in the best interests of society as a whole because a unified, comprehensive and unidirectional criminal justice system could evolve into a powerful, monolithic entity. Tensions between the components of the system are, therefore, an important safeguard against the erosion of liberty and the loss of fundamental rights and freedoms in the name of "crime fighting." The down side is the continued maintenance of a less than effective collection of government and non-government bodies that consume significant amounts of resources and which are perpetually hungry for more.

The difficulties involved in achieving at least a modicum of unification are significant. The ef-

forts currently underway to deal with criminal business organizations are instructive insofar as efforts are made to achieve some levels of cooperation and coordination (e.g., between police and Crown prosecutors) but there are clearly limits beyond which such an arrangement cannot go. Similarly, attempts by the RCMP to introduce "crime reduction strategies" rest upon a level of intra-system cooperation that may not be forthcoming because of traditional barriers within and between criminal justice components and related government and non-government bodies (Box 9).

It will be a tremendous challenge to overcome the barriers between the criminal justice system and related provincial government ministries such as health and children and family development,

Box 9: Crime Reduction Strategies

The RCMP in British Columbia are currently experimenting with an integrated, intelligence-led approach to community policing known as a "crime reduction strategy." Crime reduction strategies have been adopted in other countries, notably Britain and New Zealand with apparently good results. According to Assistant Commissioner Gary Bass, the Officer in Charge of Criminal Operations in British Columbia, the strategy involves the following:

- The creation of an enduring partnership framework with a wide range of government and community sectors in order to facilitate more effective, more unified justice, influence public policy, undertake an interdisciplinary approach to addressing crime drivers and criminal-justice issues, and enhance the socio-economic wellness/integrity of the community;
- A relentless, intelligence-led focus on prolific offenders, crime hot spots and crime drivers through a blended application of innovative prevention measures, evidence-based Problem Oriented Policing projects, directed enforcement actions, and quality investigations conducted by rapidly re-deployable, dedicated crime reduction teams which work ever-changing shifts using reliable crime data that is analysed on-site daily by crime analysts having access to the latest in crime-analysis software; and,
- Highly adaptive crime reduction teams led and supported by police leaders held accountable for achieving measurable results based on formal crime reduction performance agreements co-signed by community leaders, local Crown counsel, local healthcare and social service representatives, and local educators.

The Crime Reduction Strategy has 15 core principles and will include the drafting of a crime and disorder reduction contract between the RCMP and local community officials. Implementation will begin in 2006 through five pilot projects in the Greater Vancouver Area and in four communities throughout the province.

Sources: Bass, G. (2005) "Working Together to Build Safer Communities: The RCMP "E" Division Crime Reduction Strategy", Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police Annual Review; Moss and Stevens (2006).

and federal government departments and agencies such as immigration and customs and border protection. These are truly major silos, but it is clear that the walls can be broken down when necessary and with respect to specific issues. Diverse Inter-Ministry Committees are created to address specific problems (e.g., the Inter-Ministry Committee on Youth Violence and Crime) and appear to work extremely well, and this suggests the problems with information sharing, resource sharing and operational cooperation could be resolved on a regular basis as well.

There are other examples of potential inter-agency cooperation which suggest that silos can be removed across the board rather than just within or between governments. These include, the ICBC/police Bait Car programme, and programming in the area of restorative justice that in-

volves high levels of cooperation between the police and non-government restorative justice organizations. There are also significant partnerships involving the police and health and community living authorities in the context of the abuse and neglect of incapable adults and interventions under Part 3 of the provincial *Adult Guardianship Act*.

The recommendations of the Provincial Street Crime Working Group help to illustrate the nature and scope of the silo problem in Vancouver and the proposed Community Court highlights the extent to which the problem can be resolved through an agreement amongst agencies and ministries to work towards a common goal.[55] It is hoped that a similar spirit of cooperation and communication will spread to all aspects of criminal justice in the province. The first of the five main recommendations set out below should go a long way to achieving this goal.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1:

The provincial government should create, in partnership with the federal and municipal governments, an agency or other body such as a Criminal Justice Task Force or a Criminal Justice Commission to address the core issues and challenges facing the provincial criminal justice system, especially the effective coordination of the activities of the relevant government ministries.

The roles and functions of the Task Force or Commission should include the following:

(a) To review and resolve the three core problems facing the provincial criminal justice system that are identified in Part III of this report. Particularly, and as a matter of priority, the following issues:
- sentencing practices in the British Columbian courts
- the need for Crown Counsel to approve charges
- the delays involved in disposing of cases in the Provincial Court;

(b) To monitor, advise, and make recommendations on the coordination of all the components of the criminal justice system and the associated provincial ministries, federal departments, government agencies, Crown Corporations, non-government organizations, and private sector companies involved, in particular, in the fields of private security and crime prevention;

(c) To initiate and fund independent research on crime and the criminal justice system from which to develop evidence-based policy for the affected ministries and other organizations including, studies of the rates of victimization in the province and of the performance of the components of the criminal justice system, especially the police, Crown Counsel, the judiciary and corrections.

The choice of body or agency will depend upon whether government wants to create a temporary or a more permanent entity that will play a continuing role monitoring the criminal justice system. If a temporary body is thought to be sufficient then a Task Force with a prescribed life span is probably preferable. A Criminal Justice Commission would involve a more permanent arrange-

ment and could be something to be considered by a temporary Task Force.

The idea of a Commission is not new insofar as Commissions of this kind exist in other jurisdictions, primarily in some states in the United States and Australia and even at the municipal level in the former. The mandates of the Commissions vary – some have the kind of broad role and function recommended above while others are concerned solely with specific criminal justice issues such as organized crime – but the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission seems to be closest, philosophically, administratively, and geographically. If the idea of a similar Commission for British Columbia finds fertile soil it is strongly recommended that the developmental starting point be the Oregon Commission (Box 10).

Box 10: Oregon Criminal Justice Commission

The purpose of the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of state and local criminal justice systems by providing a centralized and impartial forum for statewide policy development and planning. The Commission is charged with developing a long-range public safety plan for Oregon, which includes making recommendations on the capacity and use of state prisons and local jails, implementation of community corrections programs and methods to reduce future criminal conduct. In addition, the Commission has a role in funding and evaluating Oregon's drug courts. The Commission also conducts research, develops impact estimates of crime-related legislation, acts as a statistical and data clearing house, administers Oregon's felony sentencing guidelines and provides staff to the advisory committees regarding asset forfeiture and racial profiling. Commission members are appointed to four-year terms by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate.

Source: http://www.ocjc.state.or.us/CJC/CJCExecSum1.pdf

The organization and membership of a British Columbia Crime and Criminal Justice Commission should be determined only after appropriate research into similar organizations in other jurisdictions and following local consultation. However, the Commission would likely consist of key, senior individuals from within the provincial government, federal criminal justice agencies, and the community, appointed by Order in Council for fixed but renewable terms and accountable to the legislature. The Commission should be provided with a budget, some modest premises and a small secretariat and have a carefully prescribed mandate.

Boards and Commissions exist to address a variety of areas of practice and policy-making in the province, and a Crime and Criminal Justice Commission is probably long overdue. It should be noted that the idea seems to be viewed favourably by some individuals who were asked about this recommendation, albeit late in the consultation process.

It will clearly take some time for the idea of a Commission to be discussed and for a Commission to be set up. In the interim, there are a number of crime and criminal justice system issues that need to be addressed without further delay.

Recommendation 2:

The provincial government must address the problem of the illegal trade in drugs in a clear and consistent manner.

In this regard, there are only three real choices. The following identification of three options should not be read as an endorsement of any one by the BC Progress Board. It is merely a statement of the options.

(a) Lobby the Federal Government to legalize the trade, perhaps limiting access to the products to adults in the same way that tobacco and alcohol access is limited and, in the same vein, treating drug addictions as health rather than criminal justice problems. The trade would be subject to reasonable taxes that could be directed to the health care system. The outcome of such a move is not entirely clear but, arguably, it is unlikely to produce higher levels of demand, and need, than is currently the case. Illegal drugs are being obtained by those who wish to use them, regardless of the prohibition. Importantly, the cost of meeting the health care needs of addicts would be paid for by revenues gathered from the industry that is, in part, responsible for the addiction. This kind of initiative would undoubtedly reduce the size and impact of a significant component of the province's underground economy which likely employs, directly and indirectly, a large number of people and reduce the size, and impact, of the proceeds of crime that are currently circulating in the economy. In addition, criminal justice resources that are currently directed to drug enforcement activities could be directed elsewhere.

(b) In the event the legalization approach is deemed unacceptable (or impractical), and there are many reasons why it is likely to meet with massive resistance both nationally and internationally, the provincial government should provide the resources necessary to eliminate the trade entirely in the province. As the costs of doing business rise dramatically (and this should be the goal of enforcement activities) the industry will probably move elsewhere. Demand for the industry's products will not decline but the collateral criminal activities associated with the industry will likely diminish significantly. This approach will require a number of indispensable components:

- a consistent and planned commitment of significant law enforcement resources for up to 10 years;
- expanded, specially trained law enforcement teams;
- new legislation to deal with the proceeds of crime and money laundering activities (particularly, legislation regulating currency exchange businesses);
- coordinated prosecution efforts involving special Crown Counsel;
- the imposition of severe penalties for drug related crimes; and,
- a carefully planned response on the part of both federal and provincial correctional services that will face a dramatically increased demand for secure correctional facilities.

The illegal trade in drugs is the bailiwick of criminal business organizations which, like any other business, are driven by a profit motive. If the costs of doing business increase dramatically and profitability declines, the organizations will likely shut down or move elsewhere. The costs of doing business will increase, and the benefits decrease, if the likelihood of arrest, conviction and significant punishment (including simple incarceration for long periods) are increased, the proceeds of criminal activity are confiscated, and opportunities to conceal or launder those proceeds are diminished or eliminated.

(c) Consideration should also be given to a combination of options (a) and (b) over time, beginning with option (b): vigorous enforcement for a 10 year period aimed at removing criminal business organizations from the illegal drug trade. This should be followed by a stepped introduction of option (a) – decriminalization – once the illegal drug trade is no longer in the hands of criminal business organizations in the province. This option should also include a comprehensive and continuous public education program to reduce the use of, and therefore demand for, drugs that clarifies, rather than glorifies, the role and impact of criminal business organizations.

These are the choices, one of which must be adopted by the provincial government without delay. The *status quo*, of course, is another option, but this is clearly not acceptable if we seek to truly reduce the rates of crime and victimization in the province.

Recommendation 3:

The collateral effects of the illegal drug trade should be addressed without further delay.

This issue has been examined extensively over the past 10 years, the options have been debated, plans have been made and the direction has been set; it is now time for action. Clearly, the Four Pillars Approach, while not without its critics, has been embraced for Vancouver where the problem is particularly acute. Since the problem now seems to be beyond Vancouver it is probably time to expand the approach to the entire province. This will require a commitment of provincial resources but, hopefully, not for a long time.

In support of the Four Pillars Approach, and particularly the law enforcement pillar, it is recommended that the province review and strengthen the *Safe Streets Act* and the *Trespass Act* to give police more power to remove troublesome individuals from public and private places. At the same time, government should provide for appropriate shelter and other support services. The government should also consider the introduction of a statute that provides for the compulsory treatment of those with addictions who decline assistance on a voluntary basis. This legislation would be analogous to the kinds of compulsory treatment provisions in existing provincial legislation notably the *Mental Health Act*, the *Health Act*, and the *Venereal Diseases Act*, and an argument can be made for the issue to be addressed through an amendment to the *Health Act* rather than by creating an entirely new statute. Obviously, there are clear precedents for this kind of statute and it is noteworthy that, in the 1970s, the province enacted a *Heroin Treatment Act* with a similar goal in mind. This Act was subsequently repealed because the need diminished. Legislation of this kind will only be necessary as a last resort and will only work if effective community based treatment facilities and resources are provided.

Other important initiatives worthy of implementation are the following:

- the provision of "wraparound" health and social services perhaps through the establishment of one or more Community Courts as recommended by the Street Crime Working Group;[56]
- provincial and/or municipal legislation that provides for tight regulation of businesses trading in second hand (often stolen) goods; and,
- a reconsideration of the need for safe or secure care legislation to deal with young people and young adults who are choosing to live on the streets and who are often involved in crime, substance abuse and related activities.

The Four Pillars Approach is generally sound but, arguably, there needs to be a better balancing of carrots and sticks and, most of all, there needs to be some action.

Recommendation 4:

The provincial government should immediately review the need for strengthened services to address childhood development issues and move quickly to introduce those services.

Clearly, existing health and social services that address childhood development issues are not adequate at this time. FASD has emerged as a significant issue, especially in Aboriginal communities, and may be linked to criminal behaviour in both youth and adults. There are probably similar problems with the children of drug addicted women although the effect of drugs ingested during pregnancy is not as clear. The province needs a system of early detection of children with problems, not just FASD related problems, through the elementary school system, and appropriate coordinated early intervention strategies and services provided by the Ministries of Health and Children and Family Development. The Ministry of Children and Family Development should take the lead role in developing and/or strengthening their plans to address this issue.

Recommendation 5:

The provincial government should, without delay, review the organization and functions of law enforcement agencies in the province.

Particular attention should be paid to four main issues:

- The regionalization of police services in the two main metropolitan areas: Vancouver and Victoria. The current situation is, to put it mildly, bizarre, and the topic surfaces for serious discussion about once every five years. The situation was last addressed in the 1998 Oppal Report on policing in the province[57] and this report appears to have resulted in some changes in the form of "functional" integration: the creation of cross departmental teams such as IHIT (the Integrated Homicide Investigation Team). At best, and without detracting from the excellence of the work of these groups, this approach has limitations including a continuation of rivalries and tensions between municipal police departments and the RCMP. The creation of two or three regional police services (Capital Regional, Greater Vancouver Regional, Fraser Valley Regional) would be the preferred route and it would be popular amongst most affected police officers, other than some RCMP officers

who seem to prefer a single, province-wide police service run entirely by their organization. In fact, the only stumbling block appears to be some local governments in the affected regions who, for political reasons, oppose the change. The reform, therefore, will have to be a provincial government initiative.

- The implementation of initiatives that are often referred to as "Operation Cooperation". This involves the creation of functional partnerships between public police services and private security services that, as a recent Law Commission of Canada report has indicated, have been growing significantly over the past 20 years and that have become private police forces performing many of the traditional police functions such as fixed point observation and limited patrolling.[58] Operation Cooperation is a term coined by the U.S. Department of Justice which supports public-private partnerships in the field of policing.[59] The core premise is simple. Instead of being separate and often conflicting entities, the reality of public/private policing is acknowledged. The resources of the two groups are combined in a more effective way with a common goal of reducing crime through general deterrence created by both visible presence and announced electronic surveillance (CCTV), fast responses to calls involving the security of property, and a willingness to arrest offenders seen committing crimes even when the target is not the property being protected by the private security service. While the challenges are numerous, the potential is enormous and it is significant that the Downtown Vancouver Business Improvement Area has already started its own version of Operation Cooperation, with some good results.
- A review of both the activities of police and their internal organization to determine whether law enforcement dollars are being spent in most cost effective way. The provincial government should develop a set of best practice guidelines based upon the extensive national and international research on policing styles and techniques and determine, amongst other things, whether police resources are being diverted by the need to perform duties that could be performed by others at less cost. Key examples would be the offender identification function which could be turned over to non-sworn members; fingerprint and forensic examinations at the scenes of crime which might be better undertaken by technically proficient, non-sworn, scenes of crime examiners; and the use of process servers, rather than uniformed police officers, to service subpoenas and other documents. A review should also consider whether the community relations activities that take police away from active street duty are worthwhile and whether police crime prevention activities should be handed over to private sector businesses for which crime prevention officers often appear to be acting as salespersons.
- Carefully monitor the success or otherwise of crime reduction strategies being implemented in other countries and by the RCMP at select sites in British Columbia. If evidence indicates that these strategies are successful in reducing crime they should be systematically deployed across the province.

Appendices

A. Board Members, Staff, and Advisory Group Members

Board Members and Staff

Members:

Mr. David Black, Chair
President
Black Press Ltd.

Mr. Herman Driediger
CEO
Driediger Investments Ltd.

Ms. Eva Lee Kwok
Chair & CEO
Amara International Investment Corporation

Ms. Jill Leversage
Managing Director
Corporate and Investment Banking
TD Securities Inc.

Mr. Gerry Martin
Co-Owner
Kra-Mar Investments

Mr. Harry McWatters
President & Founder
Sumac Ridge Estate Winery Ltd.

Dr. Martha Piper
President & Vice-Chancellor
University of British Columbia

Mr. Jeet Sandhu
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Ms. Carol W. Seable
President & CEO
Fairmont Hotsprings Resort Ltd.

Mr. Jim Shepherd
President & CEO
Canfor Corporation

Mr. Ken Shields
Chairman of the Board
Raymond James Ltd.

Mr. Mark Shuparski
President
Pacific Capital Investments

Mr. Brian Surerus
President
Surerus Pipeline Inc.

Mr. David A. Thompson
Former Deputy Chairman & CEO
Teck Cominco Ltd.

Mr. Doug Whitehead
President & CEO
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Mr. Stuart Mackay
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Chief Economist
Credit Union Central of British Columbia

B. Consultations

Judge (name withheld at the person's request)
Supreme Court of British Columbia

Ms. Laurie Baker
Manager, Road Safety, Insurance Corporation of British Columbia

Mr. Kevin Begg
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Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General

Superintendent Rick Betker
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Superintendent Barry Clark
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Mr. Serge Corbeil
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Dr. Raymond Corrado
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Mr. Don Demers
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Dr. Stephen Easton,
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Mr. Bert Phipps
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Geoff Plant, Q.C.
Former Attorney General of British Columbia

Superintendent Marianne Ryan
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Mr. Allan Seckel
Deputy Attorney General of British Columbia

Mr. Hugh Stansfield
Chief Judge of the Provincial Court of British Columbia

Mr. Robert Watts
Provincial Director, Community Corrections and Corporate Programmes, Corrections Branch, Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General.

Mr. John Winter
President and CEO, British Columbia Chamber of Commerce

Mr. Mark Withenshaw
Vice President, Loss Management and Operations Support
Insurance Corporation of British Columbia

C. Consultation Protocol

Discussions with the individuals consulted for this project who are listed in Appendix B were guided by the following protocol.

Consultation Protocol

Participant: _____

Confidentiality Issue: _____

Okay with use of name in the report: YES NO

Crime and Criminality

Crime rates have been falling in BC but appear to be flattening out. From your perspective, what needs to be done to further reduce crime in the Province?

Property crime?

Violent crime?

Youth crime?

Crime involving First Nations people?

Criminal Justice System

What needs to be done to make the provincial criminal justice system more effective?

Top three changes:

D. Key Crime Categories for Canada-US Comparison

Homicide[60]

Homicide totals are directly comparable between Canadian and US jurisdictions.

Robbery

Both nations report robbery similarly at both the aggregate total and sub category levels.

Robbery differs from regular theft in that the former involves an act or threat of violence. Canadian UCR separates robberies with a firearm, other weapon, or without. The American UCR captures more detailed robbery weapon types, such as those involving a knife, or other dangerous weapon. For comparability, it is necessary to combine (or aggregate) more specific American UCR robbery classes into one category to equate with the Canadian "other weapon" designation.

Aggravated Assault

The American UCR captures only one category (aggravated assault), where Canada captures three (aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, attempted murder). For this reason, the latter must be aggregated (or "rolled up"). Incident scoring rules for assaults committed in the course of robbery to be scored as the latter. The scoring of aggravated assaults vis-à-vis simple assaults is susceptible to undercounting of the former, when the presence of a weapon may not be recalled or documented. For comparisons between assaults with the presence of a weapon, or weapon-specific assaults, one must use the incident-based survey. In short, Canada's Level 2 and Level 3 Assaults and attempted murder would "roll up" into the US "aggravated assault" category.

Break and Enter

As is the case with aggravated assault, break and enter offences are captured in essentially similar ways by the two countries. Again, like other crime types, it is possible to make use of the incident-based survey to compare specific varieties of break and enter in some cases.

Theft

Scoring differences between Canada and the US prevent within category comparisons, but totals are directly comparable. Canada uses a threshold of theft over/under $5000, while the American survey uses the categories of: greater than $200, between $200 and $50, and less than $50. There are other subtle differences, but nothing so substantial as to affect city-city comparisons, regardless of nationality.

Motor Vehicle Theft

Canadian and American motor vehicle theft rates are essentially equivalent. The Canadian rate includes farm and construction equipment, whereas the US counts these as other larcenies. Statistics Canada has estimated that the "inflation" of the Canadian rates to those of the US to be minimal (0.5%). Each motor vehicle theft is counted as a separate offence, except in Canada when the offence occurs at an auto dealership, where only one offence is scored. This difference (an under reporting of Canadian auto thefts of an estimated 0.1%) is, again, minimal, but should be noted.

Arson

Canadian-American comparisons are possible although Canada enforces the "hierarchy rule", while the US survey double-counts arson-related offences whenever the attending offence is technically more serious than the arson. Statistics Canada estimates that approximately three percent of arsons in Canada involve a more serious offence; these are therefore "lost" to Canadian arson totals. Other small differences in the scoring of arson also lead to

a slight undercounting of US arsons with respect to the Canadian data.

Sexual Assault (CAN) vs. Forcible Rape (US)
Statistics Canada recommends that these two categories are so distinct that they should not be compared. The American classification only includes one specific interaction between a male assailant and a female victim, and only involves the specific act of intercourse. The Canadian definition contains three separate offence categories (aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault with a weapon, and simple sexual assault), and is not limited to intercourse, nor is it gender-specific. Given these significant scoring variations, comparing Canadian and American rates along these variables would not be empirically reliable.

Crime Totals
Selected Violent Crime
Violent crime totals cannot be usefully compared between Canada and the US, although, as discussed above, homicide, aggravated assault and robbery are the most comparable categories. The FBI's violent crime index is not equivalent to Canada's violent crime totals or rates. Canada's most frequently occurring violent crime (simple, or "level 1" assault) is not captured in the American incident survey.

Selected Property Crime
Property crime indices, or total property crime counts/rates, are not directly comparable between the two nations. Again, using slight adjustments and combinations of sub-categories, it is possible to generate equivalent categories of selected property crimes, such as break and enter, motor vehicle theft and arson.

Comparing Offence-Charge Rates
The Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics recommends that only three accused level offences are directly comparable. Prostitution, drug violations and impaired driving, are each primarily police-driven offences, and as such, they allow an opportunity to compare charge rates between the two nations. However, the key analytical problem one faces when working with these crime types is that they are essentially a measure of police activity, rather than real patterns of offence occurrence. As such, for most criminological questions about changing crime rates these crimes are simply a barometer of police interest in pursuing such offences, and possibly, some measure of public pressure for police to "crack down" on crime problems locally.

Prostitution
Although it is well known that prostitution is not, in and of itself, illegal in Canada, logically dependent activities – communicating for the purposes of, and living off the avails of prostitution – make the act essentially impossible to conduct without contravening at least some prostitution-related provisions. As a result, Canadian prostitution offences are comparable to the American data which are generated from prostitution specifically. Total prostitution offences are the most appropriate categories to compare, as this is the only number collected in the US incident survey.

Controlled Drugs and Substances
Due to differences in sub-category collection, the Canadian offences of trafficking and cultivation require aggregation to equate to the US category of "sale/manufacture".

Population Units – Definitions
This report includes crime trends at the provincial, municipal and Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) levels. The CMA is a Statistics Canada reporting jurisdiction that typically includes one major urban centre, such as Vancouver, Montreal or Toronto, and their respective suburbs. For the Vancouver CMA, this area is equivalent to the Greater Vancouver Regional District, which includes several municipalities, including Richmond and Surrey, among others. Although not strictly equivalent, CMA trends are essentially the same as those observed at the municipal level, given the typical prominence of the namesake municipality relative to others within the same CMA. Stated simply, Vancouver City's crime totals tend to have the largest impact on the overall "Vancouver CMA" crime rates, even though Surrey and other cities have sizeable populations and crime counts.

E. Supporting Data Tables

Table E1: Other Crime, rate per 100,000 population

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Canada	2,707	2,656	2,603	2,610	2,518	2,601	2,668	2,764	3,058	3,114	3,081
Ontario	2,578	2,434	2,293	2,270	2,080	2,146	2,073	1,987	2,028	1,934	2,224
Toronto	2,040	1,938	1,787	1,669	1,471	1,508	1,555	1,529	1,499	1,363	n/a
Manitoba	3,842	3,833	3,814	3,853	3,921	4,129	4,609	4,670	5,343	5,452	5,149
Winnipeg	2,889	2,916	2,894	2,969	2,967	3,336	3,700	3,829	4,259	4,208	n/a
Saskatchewan	3,848	4,036	4,383	4,834	4,874	5,291	5,933	6,061	6,771	6,915	6,853
Saskatoon	3,250	3,421	3,733	4,058	3,886	4,607	4,943	5,051	5,482	5,378	n/a
Alberta	2,871	2,882	3,081	3,071	3,219	3,221	3,575	3,782	4,087	4,238	4,053
Calgary	1,743	1,737	1,792	1,739	1,695	1,736	1,898	1,961	2,008	2,052	n/a
Edmonton	2,436	2,562	2,882	2,750	2,841	2,739	3,204	3,675	3,995	4,041	n/a
British Columbia	3,875	3,743	3,594	3,644	3,558	3,675	3,802	3,905	4,314	4,564	4,498
Vancouver	3,133	3,022	2,647	2,743	2,697	2,859	2,944	2,930	3,340	3,676	n/a
Victoria	3,955	3,926	4,004	4,157	4,120	4,034	3,558	3,542	4,017	3,576	n/a

Source: Statistics Canada

Table E2: Homicide Rate, per 100,000 population

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Canada	2.0	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.7	2.0	2.0
Ontario	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.7
Toronto	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.7	1.3	1.7	1.6	1.8	1.9	1.8	2.0
Manitoba	2.4	4.0	2.7	2.9	2.3	2.6	3.0	3.1	3.7	4.3	4.2
Winnipeg	2.4	4.2	3.1	2.7	2.2	2.5	2.8	3.4	2.6	4.9	3.7
Saskatchewan	2.1	3.1	2.5	3.2	1.3	2.6	2.7	2.7	4.1	3.9	4.3
Saskatoon	1.4	1.8	3.5	3.1	1.7	3.0	0.4	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.7
Alberta	2.2	1.9	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.3	2.3	2.0	2.7	3.3
Calgary	2.2	1.4	1.0	2.1	1.4	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.1	1.9	2.4
Edmonton	2.2	2.2	3.1	2.4	2.1	2.0	2.6	2.7	2.2	3.4	4.3
British Columbia	3.2	3.2	2.9	2.3	2.7	2.1	2.1	3.1	2.3	2.7	2.3
Vancouver	3.5	3.0	2.7	2.3	2.8	2.1	2.1	3.3	2.1	2.6	2.9
Victoria	1.9	2.0	2.0	3.3	2.9	2.3	1.3	1.0	1.5	1.5	0.6
Washington	5.1	4.6	4.3	3.9	3.0	3.3	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.3
Seattle	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	4.0	3.0	3.1	2.9	3.5	3.1	2.9
Olympia	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	2.0	1.0	2.8	0.9	1.8	3.6	0.9
Spokane	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	3.6	2.9	2.4	4.6	3.7	3.4	3.6
Oregon	4.1	4.0	2.9	3.0	2.7	2.0	2.4	2.0	1.9	2.5	2.2
Portland	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	2.9	2.1	2.4	2.1	2.0	2.9	2.6
Eugene	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	1.6	2.2	1.2	1.8	1.5	1.0	2.4

Sources: Statistics Canada; Washington Association of Sherrifs & Police Chiefs; Oregon State Police Note: as a result on ongoing investigations in Port Coquitlam, BC, there were 15 homicides recorded in 2002, 7 recorded in 2003, and 5 recorded in 2004 that occurred in previous years.

Table E3: Assault (levels 1 to 3), rate per 100,000 population

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Canada	743	743	744	743	728	762	764	751	748	732	727
Ontario	729	707	692	686	656	684	681	639	593	567	558
Toronto	670	641	640	631	611	668	670	613	553	520	n/a
Manitoba	1,214	1,294	1,310	1,238	1,203	1,305	1,281	1,297	1,278	1,251	1,253
Winnipeg	931	1,064	1,024	904	831	992	948	935	845	820	n/a
Saskatchewan	953	994	1,160	1,243	1,275	1,352	1,485	1,496	1,679	1,656	1,626
Saskatoon	906	955	942	993	967	1,092	1,176	1,143	1,186	1,094	n/a
Alberta	743	752	817	844	824	835	867	849	864	867	877
Calgary	520	561	621	640	642	674	653	604	628	618	n/a
Edmonton	648	642	692	700	587	658	674	645	639	597	n/a
British Columbia	1,074	1,085	1,084	1,055	1,005	1,006	979	972	981	963	978
Vancouver	916	931	889	848	816	831	796	776	797	786	n/a
Victoria	1,041	1,092	1,142	1,094	1,043	927	931	923	901	744	n/a

Source: Statistics Canada

Table E4: Robbery, rate per 100,000 population											
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Canada	104	107	99	96	95	88	88	85	90	86	89
Ontario	87	88	83	81	76	72	76	74	78	75	79
Toronto	139	142	133	125	116	107	111	105	112	103	109
Manitoba	182	177	188	160	174	161	158	141	151	149	170
Winnipeg	285	281	298	250	270	252	247	221	234	229	263
Saskatchewan	66	79	96	95	87	92	109	108	144	120	125
Saskatoon	134	163	190	200	185	207	222	219	305	209	248
Alberta	77	84	82	88	86	84	89	84	102	87	91
Calgary	103	106	117	107	109	104	107	98	116	91	103
Edmonton	112	131	119	142	135	133	144	132	163	141	142
British Columbia	159	163	150	142	140	121	114	112	108	108	109
Vancouver	253	259	237	217	219	188	170	165	154	148	149
Victoria	131	129	121	126	104	92	92	79	72	76	60
Washington	138	119	120	112	101	99	99	96	93	95	92
Seattle	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	135	127	127	121	124	129	126
Olympia	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	46	50	48	53	41	41	44
Spokane	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	126	115	136	113	107	87	82
Oregon	137	122	118	106	86	84	79	78	80	77	68
Portland	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	121	115	104	109	107	100	92
Eugene	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	88	86	89	67	76	73	57

Sources: Statistics Canada; Washington Association of Sherrifs & Police Chiefs; Oregon State Police

Table E5: Drugs, rate per 100,000 population											
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Canada	n/a	222	223	235	264	287	288	296	274	304	286
Ontario	n/a	187	187	213	223	250	237	242	183	230	225
Toronto	n/a	134	141	173	197	228	220	214	160	213	n/a
Manitoba	n/a	166	189	173	168	183	216	233	228	237	183
Winnipeg	n/a	137	141	140	133	160	176	199	196	192	n/a
Saskatchewan	n/a	202	206	232	256	232	282	349	324	326	310
Regina	n/a	169	133	126	215	170	186	204	190	201	n/a
Saskatoon	n/a	193	211	242	255	221	283	302	279	323	n/a
Alberta	n/a	188	181	185	196	232	236	242	238	280	258
Calgary	n/a	108	109	117	128	164	192	204	170	191	n/a
Edmonton	n/a	166	159	162	178	204	169	162	173	181	n/a
British Columbia	n/a	417	427	423	509	543	568	549	593	634	607
Vancouver	n/a	356	374	354	447	519	498	471	504	557	n/a
Victoria	n/a	401	428	441	425	449	540	461	533	458	n/a

Source: Statistics Canada

Table E6: Motor Vehicle Theft, rate per 100,000 population											
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Canada	552	608	592	550	531	522	543	516	550	531	496
Ontario	522	528	498	443	435	412	415	382	382	337	315
Toronto	444	523	465	412	404	368	372	348	381	325	306
Manitoba	845	902	994	926	939	1,029	1,147	1,048	1,110	1,364	1,206
Winnipeg	1,182	1,263	1,370	1,284	1,320	1,435	1,592	1,385	1,489	1,932	1,712
Saskatchewan	522	635	688	715	698	758	799	695	779	747	621
Saskatoon	513	567	626	567	534	670	551	532	743	590	550
Alberta	460	514	545	535	503	496	571	577	663	646	652
Calgary	634	671	755	754	669	581	576	537	549	457	440
Edmonton	423	558	530	482	460	535	746	777	953	1,018	1,059
British Columbia	782	963	827	736	741	725	815	875	951	890	818
Vancouver	1,114	1,401	1,121	1,021	1,056	1,065	1,154	1,185	1,240	1,104	990
Victoria	413	361	378	307	390	234	361	287	306	336	260
Washington	564	522	568	602	587	594	653	667	663	697	784
Seattle	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	873	858	940	944	976	1,019	1,154
Olympia	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	244	260	315	293	270	284	358
Spokane	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	366	471	609	584	527	615	611
Oregon	702	531	595	542	411	407	427	469	534	516	529
Portland	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	507	496	509	564	628	626	594
Eugene	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	458	467	415	453	563	608	909

Sources: Statistics Canada; Washington Association of Sherrifs & Police Chiefs; Oregon State Police

Table E7: Break and Enter, rate per 100,000 population											
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Canada	1,334	1,341	1,248	1,163	1,046	956	901	878	900	860	804
Ontario	1,125	1,090	963	889	804	730	692	675	659	598	545
Toronto	857	838	764	671	620	558	558	552	534	449	388
Manitoba	1,471	1,473	1,482	1,411	1,331	1,239	1,157	1,091	1,219	1,202	1,122
Winnipeg	1,548	1,549	1,506	1,404	1,246	1,236	1,160	1,042	1,162	1,124	1,070
Saskatchewan	1,786	1,810	1,849	1,748	1,662	1,569	1,512	1,521	1,729	1,702	1,468
Saskatoon	2,003	2,090	2,031	1,817	1,806	1,759	1,750	1,648	2,043	1,797	1,494
Alberta	1,134	1,134	1,101	1,033	992	892	836	876	969	971	892
Calgary	1,165	1,234	1,141	1,092	1,023	817	820	783	840	815	777
Edmonton	1,233	1,234	1,214	1,082	1,036	983	867	960	1,020	1,129	1,025
British Columbia	2,004	2,030	1,822	1,643	1,448	1,284	1,272	1,224	1,289	1,258	1,166
Vancouver	2,433	2,485	2,161	1,887	1,609	1,437	1,408	1,306	1,367	1,325	1,192
Victoria	1,381	1,283	1,151	1,086	1,027	851	791	730	753	935	804
Washington	1,091	1,058	1,106	1,037	950	907	886	906	950	977	960
Seattle	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	854	809	793	829	908	984	910
Olympia	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	836	914	865	831	754	797	787
Spokane	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	1,350	1,131	1,175	1,023	1,089	1,221	895
Oregon	1,103	988	1,033	n/a	807	749	768	730	804	837	759
Portland	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	816	749	764	729	785	812	715
Eugene	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	1,103	900	837	748	928	1,095	1,060

Source: Statistics Canada; Washington Assoc. of Sherrifs & Police Chiefs; Oregon State Police

F. Notes

[1] See generally, BC Progress Board, Annual Reports, December 2005, available online at (URL: http//www.bcprogressboard.com/bmark_reports.php?p=benchmarks.php), accessed June 1, 2006. The reader is directed to Performance Indicators 15 and 24 for BC regional and national comparisons, in Volumes II and I respectively.

[2] See Core Target 6 (social condition), at URL: (http://www.bcprogressboard.com/coreTargets.php?p=benchmarks.php), accessed June 1, 2006.

[3] See the Statistics Canada report by M. Gannon, Feasibility study on crime comparisons between Canada and the United States (No. 85F0035XIE).

[4] Hartnagel (1997); Silverman, Teevan & Sacco (2000).

[5] Ouimet (2002), is an exception.

[6] Kennedy & Veitch (1997).

[7] Of those events that come to the attention of the police, only some are acted upon immediately, in which the nature of the event can be confirmed or "founded", while others are either held until resources become available through some form of priority assessment, or even, as in the case of break and enter in some BC jurisdictions, or theft from auto in most, no action is taken at all. In the latter case, the only action taken by police is to record the event. The importance of such practices is the role the police themselves play in generating "founded" cases, and therefore, the accumulation of crime data.

[8] Hackler (2003).

[9] Andresen (2006).

[10] For example, see the edited collection of papers by Blumstein & Wallman (2006).

[11] Hartnagel (1997).

[12] Felson (2002).

[13] Source for comparisons: Statistics Canada; CANSIM Table 051-0001.

[14] Blumstein and Wallman (2006). For a current and comprehensive review, see the Statistics Canada report by Bunge, Johnson and Baldé. (June 2005), available online at URL: (http://www.statcan.ca/english/research/85-561-MIE/85-561-MIE2005005.htm), accessed 23 August 2006.

[15] Bunge, Johnson and Baldé (June 2005).

[16] BC Progress Board, Annual Reports, December 2005.

[17] Kinney (2005).

[18] Bunge, Johnson and Baldé. (June 2005).

[19] This difference in processing and applying warrants was studied almost 20 years ago (Rossmo, 1987). Variations exist regarding the precise magnitude of these high-rate offenders, with some claiming as low as 10 percent accounting for as much as 60-90 percent. Other estimates have 20 percent accounting for approximately two-thirds of all offences.

[20] Kinney (2005).

[21] In addition to the research cited above, see Brantingham and Brantingham (1984), Ouimet (1999) and Bunge, Johnson and Baldé. (June 2005).

[22] 2004 is the latest data point available for this crime type at the CMA level. 2005 data are only available at the CMA level for total criminal code offences, see Statistics Canada report "Crime Statistics in Canada, 2005" (Catalogue No. 85-002, Vol. 26, No. 4).

[23] Data not reproduced here; see Statistics Canada report Crime Statistics in Canada, 2005 (Catalogue No. 85-002, Vol. 26, No. 4).

[24] Department of Justice; URL: (http://justicecanada.ca/en/ps/yj/ycja/why.html), accessed 4 August

2006.

[25] Sloan, et al. (1988).

[26] Gannon (2001).

[27] Note: includes a combination of Canadian assault II (with a weapon or causing bodily harm) and III ("aggravated assault") in order to equate with the American UCR "Aggravated Assault". This report does not include "attempted homicide" in the Canadian rates for two reasons; the first is that the raw counts for these offences are infrequent (at between 3 and 5 incidence per 100,000 persons). The second reason is that with this slight "undercount" of aggravated assault for Canadian trends is in the same direction of a noted tendency for American police services to undercount aggravated assaults when failing to score the incident as involving a weapon (see Gannon, 2001).

[28] General Social Survey (GSS) data are drawn from Maire Gannon, Statistics Canada, Social and Aboriginal Statistics Division, General social survey on victimization, Cycle 18: An overview of findings, 2004.

[29] Angus Reid Group, (July/August, 1997). "Justice and Public Safety Issue: Crime and Canada's Justice System".

[30] Gannon, M., Mihorean, M. and Statistics Canada (2005). Criminal Victimization in Canada, 2004. Catalogue Number 85-002-XPE, Vol. 25, no. 7.

[31] Victimization rates for physical assaults do not include either categories of spousal assaults: physical or sexual. Physical assaults do not distinguish between levels of seriousness (Levels 1, 2 or 3).

[32] Provincial victimization rate data are reported in Gannon & Mihorean (2005), Criminal Victimization in Canada, 2004, Table 1.

[33] Montreal CMA reports the lowest reliable rate, 64 total violent victimizations per 100,000 persons 15 years of age or older; see Gannon & Mihorean (2005), Criminal Victimization in Canada, 2004, Table 2.

[34] See Felson (1994) for a readable discussion of offender characteristics; data are drawn from Tables 3 and 4 of the Gannon & Mihorean (2005) report.

[35] Gannon & Mihorean (2005) report, Table 5.

[36] The Toronto Star recently reported (1 Aug 2006) a major gun and marijuana bust URL: (http://thestar.com). Although trading of American guns for Canadian marijuana was not mentioned, anecdotal discussions with police officers suggest that such a trade is frequently a part of payment; presumably due to gun restrictions north of the border.

[37] Organized Crime Agency of BC: Annual Report 2004-2005.

[38] A 2004 report prepared by Professor Stephen Easton, an economist, is helpful in this regard. See Easton (2004).

[39] Easton (2004).

[40] See BC Progress Board 2005 Annual Benchmarking Report with special box referencing Giles and Tedds.

[41] Marijuana production data are reported in Plecas, D., Malm, A., & Kinney, B. (2005). Marijuana Growing Operations in British Columbia Revisited (1997-2003). Abbotsford, BC: University-College of the Fraser Valley. Retrieved July 23, 2005, from (http://www.ucfv.ca/pages/Special/Marijuana_Grow_Ops_in_BC_Study.pdf). See also, Statistics Canada report Crime statistics, 200" (Catalogue No. 85-205-XIE).

[42] See, e.g., BC Justice Review Task Force (2005).

[43] For a discussion of life-course theory in criminology see Sampson and Laub (1993), and Piquero and Mazerolle (2001).

[44] See, Fishbein (2000) and Walsh (2002) for the effects of biological deficiencies on criminal behavior, and Couy and Fast (2000) for a specific discussion of FASD and criminality. For more about attachment disorder and social psychological effects see Bowlby (1969, 1973); Cassidy and Shaver (1999); and, Andrews and Bonta (2001).

[45] Sampson and Laub (1993); Piquero and Mazerolle (2001).

[46] Akers (1998).

[47] For an explanation of the correctional programming used in Canada and many part of the United States, see Andrews and Bonta (2001). For a thorough critique of this approach see Haney (2005).

[48] See, e.g., Fishbein (2001) who includes a thorough discussion of brain injury and criminality. See, also, the Fall 2005 edition of Justice Report which is dedicated entirely to mental health and offenders.

[49] Motiuk and Porporino (1991); Andrews and Bonta (2001).

[50] See Arrigo (2001) for a discussion of "transcarceration".

[51] BC Justice Review Task Force (2005).

[52] See the August 2006 edition of Let's Talk for a review and discussion of Aboriginal justice interventions in the Correctional Service of Canada.

[53] Canadian Bankers Association (2005).

[54] BC Justice Review Task Force (2005).

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Oppal (1998).

[58] Law Commission of Canada (2006).

[59] US Department of Justice (2000).

[60] The discussion of offence-offence comparisons between the US and Canada is adapted from the Gannon report (2001).

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